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TWENTY-TWO YEARS OF THE NBER-ASA QUARTERLY ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK SURVEYS: ASPECTS AND COMPARISONS OF FORECASTING PERFORMANCE
ABSTRACT
The National BureauofEconomic Research, in co-operation with the American Statistical
Association, conducted a regular quarterly survey of professional macroeconomic forecasters for 22 years
beginning in 1968. The survey produced a mass of information about characteristics and resultsofthe
forecasting process. Many studies have already used some of this material, but this is the first
comprehensive examination of all of it.
This report addresses several subjects and produces findings on each, as follows:
(1) The distributions of error statistics across the forecasters: the dispersion among the individual
predictions is often large and it typically increases with forecast horizon, as do the mean absolute (or
squared) errors.
(2) The role of the time-series properties of the target data: the more volatile the time series, the
larger as a rule are the errors of the forecasts.
(3) The role of revisions in "actual" data: forecast errors tend to be larger the greater the extent
of the revisions.
(4) Differences by subpcriod: there is little evidence of an overall improvement or deterioration in
forecasts between the l970s and the 1980s.
(5) Combining the individual forecasts into group mean or 'consensus" forecasts: this generally
results in large gains in accuracy.
(6) Comparisons with a well-known macroeconometric model: the group forecasts are more
accurate for most but not all variables and spanS.
(7) Comparisons with state-of-the-art time series models: the group forecasts and at least half of
the individual forecasts tend to outperform Bayesian vector autoregressive models in most (but not
all) cases. The univariate ARIMA forecasts arc generally the weakest.
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and NBER1. Introduction
Humanactionhas always been to a large extent oriented to the future. Since
ancienttimes, man hoped to outwitfate and surviveby magic divination; he also hoped to
outwit nature and others by shrewd calculation. Attempts to predict the future, therefore,
are as old as magic, but they are also as old as commerce, savingand investment. Their
motivation must have always been largely economic, despite the inevitable frustrations of
economic forecasting.
Great foresight in business matters is presumably highly profitable and rare. Its
possessor will do well to exploit it directly for personalenrichment, hence should not be
inclined to offer its products to the public in the open market. An economistwho
perceives competitive markets as working with reasonable efficiencyshould not expect any
forecasts of stock prices or interest rates to be both freely traded and consistentlymuch
better than average. Forecasting macroeconomic aggregates such as real ON? and its major
expenditure components is likely t have less potential for direct profitabilitythan
forecasting financial variables. Hence, it is presumably less vulnerable tothat old American
adage rebuking expert advisers: "If you're so smart, whyain't you rich?' (cf. McCloskey
1988).
For reasons explained in part 2 below, macroforecast assessments, to be interesting
and robust, should cover a broad range of forecasters, variables, and economicconditions.
The forecasts must be explicit, verifiable, and sufficient to allow a responsible appraisal.2
Unfortunately, most of the available time series of forecasts are short and none are free
of some gaps, discontinuities and inconsistencies. Relying on a small sample of specilic
forecasts from an individual source risks overexposure to isolated hits or misses due to
chance. It is therefore necessary to concentrate on a set of forecasts from numerous and
various sources. This is likely to improve the coverage by types of information and methods
used as well.
The way to collect the required data is to conduct regularly, for a sufficiently long
time and with appropriate frequency, a survey that would be reasonably representative of
the professional activities of macroeconomic forecasters. A joint project of the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and the Business and Economic Statistics Section
of the American Statistical Association (ASA) had the purpose of accomplishing just that.
The NBER-ASA survey assembled a large amount of information on the record of
forecasting annual and quarterly changes in the U.S. economy during the period 1968:4-
1990:1 (86 consecutive quarters). It reached a broadly based and diversified group of
persons regularly engaged in the analysis of current and prospective business conditions.
Most of the responding economists came from corporate business and finance, but
academic institutions, government, consulting firms, trade associations, and labor unions
were also represented. The forecasts covered a broad range of principal aggregative time
series relating to income, production, consumption, investment, profits, government
purchases, unemployment, the price level, and interest rates. The surveys also collected3
data on the methods and assumptions used by the participants and on the probabilities they
attached to alternative prospects concerning changes in nominal or real GNPand the
implicitprice deflator.
The NBER-ASA data have their shortcomings, the main of these being probably the
high turnover of participants and large frequency of gaps in their responses.The collected
data represent a mixture of public and private predictions. The survey members, generally
professional forecasters, were identified by code only. Their anonymity helped toraise the
survey response rates but may have had otherwise ambiguous consequences (encouraging
the independence of judgment? reducing the sense of individual responsibility?).
The initiative to develop and maintain the quarterly NBER-ASA survey was strongly
motivated by the desire to make it "the vehicle for a scientific record of economic forecasts'
(Moore 1969, p. 42.5).Theexpectation that such a survey would be of considerable service
to both the profession and the public was shared by Moore with others who helped to
implement his proposal (including one of the authors of this paperwho had the
responsibility for reporting on the NBER-ASA survey during theentire period of its
existence). In retrospect, it seems fair to say that the assembled data do indeed provide
us with rich and in part unique information, which can help support muchneeded research
on the potential and limitations of forecasting economic change.
Twenty-two years of a survey that attracted numerous responses from a varietyof
sources each quarter add up to a mass of information about the processesand results of4
macroeconomic forecasting. Although many studies have already used some of this
material, much of it was, and still is, to be explored. This report is the first to examine all
the variables included in the NBER-ASA forecasts, for all horizons and over the entire
period covered. It concentrates on the properties of the distributions of summary measures
of error, by variable and span of forecast, viewed against the background of descriptive
statistics for the predicted time series. Other subjects of interest include the role of
characteristics and revisions of "actual" data in the evaluation of the forecasts; differences
by subperiod, roughly the 1970s vs. the 1980s; the relationship between the individual and
group mean or "consensus" forecasts from the surveys; the comparative accuracyof the
survey results and predictions with a well-known macroeconometric model; and comparisons
with forecasts from state-of-the-art multivariate and univariate time series models.
Part 2 of this paper examines some general problems and history of forecast
evaluations and surveys. Part 3 presents the NBER-ASA data and the methods used. Parts
4 through 7 discuss the results of the analysis and form the core of the paper. Part 8 draws
the conclusions.
2. The Diversity of Forecasts and Their Evaluation
2.1 Some Reflections on Predictability and Uncertainty
It is readily observed that, at any time, predictions of a given variable or event can and
in general do differ significantly across forecasters.Indeed, modern macroeconomic5
forecasts display a great diversity, which must be taken into account in thinking about how
to assemble and evaluate the related data.
Although changes in the economy are predicted primarily to meet the demand for
forecasts by public and private decision makers, they are also predicted to test theories and
analytical methods and to argue for or against points of policy. Some conditions and
aspects of the economy are much more amenable to prediction than others. Furthermore,
individual forecasters differ with respect to skills, training, experience, and the espoused
theories and ideologies. They compete by trying to improve and differentiate their models,
methods, and products. They respond to new developments in the economy and new ways
to observe and analyze them. In sum, there are both general and specific reasons for the
observed diversity of forecasts.
Comparisons among forecasts that are differentiated in several respects are difficult
yet unavoidable. The quality of a forecast
standards of predictive performance must
forecasts along each of the relevant dimension.
Surely, the main value of a forecast lies in its ability to reduce the
the future faced by the user. In general, a forecast will perform better
smaller and closer to randomness its errors are. However, the value of a
not only on its accuracy and unbiasedness but also on the predictability








in this regard the
forecast depends
of the variable or6
Where the probability of occurrence for the forecasting target is high, uncertainty is low and
prediction is easy hut not very informative; where that probability is low, uncertainty is high
and prediction is difficult but potentially very valuable (ci. Theil 1967).
For example, total stocks of the nation's wealth and productive capital normally
change little from one month or quarter to the next, barring a catastrophic war or a natural
disaster, and so can be predicted with small relative errors. Much the same applies to
other typically "slow" stock variables such as total inventories of goods or monetary
aggregates and the overall price level (but not in periods of rapid inflation!). In contrast,
income and expenditure aggregates represent "fast" flow variables, some of which, e.g.,
corporate profits, investment in plant and equipment, housing starts, and change in business
inventories are highly volatile over the short horizons and apt to be very difficult to forecast
accurately. Rates of change in indexes of price levels fall in the same category.
There are also situations that are unique or nearly so where no objective or
subjective probabilities based on past history or experience are believed to apply and 'true"
(nonergodic) uncertainty rules (as in Knight 1921, p. 233). According to Keynes (1936, p.
149), "Our knowledge of the factors which will govern the yield of an investment some years
hence is usually very slight and often negligible," yet businessmen must make decisions to
make or buy plant and equipment despite this recognized state of ignorance. In economics,
as in history, statistical-stochastic methods have limited applicability (cf. Hicks 1979; Solow
1985). Forecasters cannot afford to be deterred by such considerations and assume some7
predictabilitythroughout, never full uncertainty.Across many variables, uncertainty
depends on the "state of nature" (more explicitly, on the state of the econoniy or the phase
of the business cycle). Thus, it is much easier to predict continued moderate growth once
it is clear that the economy entered a period of sustained expansion than it is to predict the
occurrence and timing of a general downturn after the expansion has tasted for some time
andmaybe slowing down.
Influential public macroforecasts could in principle be either self-invalidating or self-
validating. Thus, if the government believed a forecast of a recession next year, it might
succeed in stimulating the economy so as to make the expansion continue. On the other
hand, if consumers generally came to expect a recession because of such a forecast, they
may each try to protect themselves by spending less nowand dissaving later when the bad
times arrive.Businessmen, acting on similar expectations, may reduce investment
expenditures and financing, production, and inventory costs. But such actions, although
individually rational, would collectively help bring about the recession no one wants.
Indeed, an early theoretical monograph on forecasts of general business conditions
concluded, on these grounds, that they cannot be accurate, particularly if they are made
public (Morgenstern 1928). However, it is not necessarily true that a known forecast must
be falsified by agents' reaction to it, even if that reaction does affect the course of events.
Conceptually, the reaction can be known and taken into account for bounded variables
related by continuous functions (Grunherg and Modigliani 1954).' But the public prediction8
canhecorrect only if the corresponding privatepredictionis correct, which of course is
often not the case. Forecasting remains difficult whether or not its results are published.
The premise of a generally shared belief and confidence in a commonly held forecast is so
unrealistic as to deprive the theoretical exercises based on it of much practical interest.
2.2 A Brief History of Forecast Appraisals and Su'eys
Qualitative judgments about contemporary levels of, and changes in, general business
activity are among the oldest economic data. A compilation of such records provided
partial evidence for the NBER work on identi'ing and dating the business cycles of history
(Thorp 1926; Burns and Mitchell 1946). A look at these "business annals" that go back to
the 1830s reminds one of the importance of public perceptions and expectations concerning
aspects of the general economic and financial activity: employment, production, prices,
interest rates.
This expectational element in the dynamics of economic life has probably long
attracted great attention of students of current events and men of affairs.
It has not much concerned those early theorists who have been preoccupied with problems
of long-run static equilibrium. But some prominent economists in the classical tradition
stressed the role in business cycles of variations in expectations and "confidence" (Marshall),
or hypothesized the occurrence of sequences of overoptimism and overpessimism (Pigou),
or attributed to bankers and entrepreneurs predictive errors resulting in malinvestments9
(Hayek). Keynes and some of his later followers elaborated on the destabilizing role of
uncertainty. Along with the formal models of interacting economic processes came the
theories of expectation formation, first that of adaptive and later that of rational
expectations. In the last twenty years or so, incomplete informationand expectational
errors acquired prime importance in models of economists of various persuasions
(monetarist, new-classical, new-Keynesian). The corresponding literature grew rapidly.
Lack of quantitative data has long hampered the progress of economics, causing
empirical work and tests to lag well behind the formulation of theories and hypotheses.
Numerical data on forecasts and expectations are particularly scarce, except for the very
recent period of great expansion in economic and financial prediction and consulting
activities. Hence, the literature on macroeconomic forecasting has a brief history, although
it too grew rapidly of late.2
The first forecasting services in the United States to gain considerable success date
back to the years immediately preceding World War I and the 1920s. They used lead-lag
relationships to predict business cycle turning points, relying mainly on the tendencyof
stock prices to lead and short-term interest rates to lag business activity. The sequence,
best-known as the Harvard "ABC" curves, had a basis in theory and fact but it was a
crudely oversimplified predecessor of the indicator system subsequently developed atthe
NBER. It performed rather well in the period 1903-14 and in the depression of 1920-2 1,
and it would have applied generally in recent times as well (cf. Moore 1969), but the10
Harvard service failed to foresee the onset and extent of the Great Depression, which
doomed this and the related forecasting efforts. A 1988 post-mortem study, using the
Harvard data and modern vector autoregressive (VAR) model techniques, concludes that
the large declines in output that followed the 1929 stock market crash were not forecastable
(Dominguez, Fair, and Shapiro 1988). This, however, is disputed by a very recent paper
that applies the Neftci sequential-analysis method to the Harvard index (Niemira and Klein
1991).
Monthly forecasts from six sources, 1918-28, were scored for accuracy in Cox 1929,
to our knowledge the first methodical appraisal of ex ante predictions of U.S. business
activity. Cox found evidence of a moderate forecasting success despite the poor showing
at the 1923-24 recession.
The earliest compilation of quantitative macro-forecasts, so far as we can tell, was
the informal survey conducted since 1947 by Joseph Livingston, the late syndicated financial
columnist based in Philadelphia. Twice a year he collected predictions of such variables
as industrial production and the consumer price index and summarized the results in a
business outlook column published in June and December. The forecasters were mostly
business and financial economists but also some academics. The Livingston data represent
a unique source of valuable information on forecasts for the early post-World War II
period, and in the 1970s they began to be widely used in research, primarily on price
expectations. But Livingston adjusted his published "consensus forecasts" (means of the11
collected individual predictions) in an attempt to take into account any large revisions in
the actual data that may have occurred between the mailing of his questionnaire and the
submission of his column to the press. arlson 1977 recalculated the semiannual Livingston
forecasts of CPIandWPIinflationrates for 1947-75 from the original data so as to reflect
properly the timing of the predictions and the information incorporated inthem.4
As quantitative macroeconomic data and forecasts began to accumulate in the 1950s
and 1960s, valid examinations of the accuracy and properties of the latter became
increasingly possible (Okun 1959; Theil 1961, 1966; Suits 1962, Stekler 1968). A
comprehensive NBER study initiated in 1963 resulted iii a systematic collection and
appraisal of annual and quarterly, public and private, judgmental and econometric forecasts
of important economic aggregates and indexes as well as such events as business cycle
peaks and troughs (Zarnowitz 1967, 1972; Fels and Hinshaw 1968; Mincer 1969;Moore
1969; Cole 1969; Evans, Haitovsky, and Treyz 1972; Haitovsky, Treyz, and Su 1974).
In 1968, a regular quarterly survey of general economic forecasts was established at
the initiative of Geoffrey Moore, then president of ASA, to be conducted co-operatively by
the NBER and the Business and Economic Statistics Section of the ASA.5 This was the
firstmajororganized effort to build up reliable information about the potential and
limitations of short-term aggregative economic forecasts, which would provide a broad base
for research and improvements in this field. The ASA has "agreed to carry out the surveys
for a period long enough to assure accumulation of useful experience and evidence," while12
the National Bureau "has assumed responsibility for the tabulation of forecasts, computation
of error statistics and other measures, and research in evaluating the results and their
analytical implications" (Zarnowitz 1968, pp. 1-2). The co-operation was to last22 years.
One measure of its success is that in 1990 the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
undertook to continue the survey essentially in the same way as it was conducted by the
NBER and the ASA.
3. The NBER-ASASurvey; Characteristics.Measures. and Data
3.1 Coverage
Table 1 identifies each of the variables covered by title, source, symbol, the
Commerce series number, and the form in which we use the data. in the period 1968:4-
1981:2 (column 5), direct forecasts were made for seven nominal indicators and three real
indicators; also, predictions for GNP in constant dollars were derived from those for GNP
in current dollars and the implicit price deflator. In the period 1981:3-1990:1 (column 6),
direct forecasts were made for six nominal and eleven real variables. Seven major
expenditure components of real GNP, the consumer price index, Treasury bill rate, and
corporate bond yield were added to the list; four nominal series (expenditures for consumer
durables, plant and equipment, and national defense, and change in business inventories)
were dropped.13
The change in 1981 resulted from new initiatives taken by the NBER in the
preceding year.Aspecial questionnaire mailed to a long list of professional forecasters
(both the past and present survey participants and others) collected much useful
information about the reactions to the design and uses of the NBER-ASA survey, the
improvements suggested, and the assumptions and procedures favored. There was strong
sentiment for expanding the survey by including several additional variables. The problem
was how to comply with these wishes without either losing the essential continuity or
overloading the survey and risking discouragement of future participations. An advisory
committee helped make the desirable changes.6
A large number of individuals participated in the earliest surveys but many were not
prepared to fill out a detailed questionnaire each quarter and soon dropped out. Of the
more than 150 persons who responded to the survey at one time or another, many had
sporadic records and some submitted incomplete questionnaires. To exclude such
occasional forecasters, we decided to use only
the responses of those who answered at least 10 surveys, providing information for most
variables and horizons. Note that the surveys need not be consecutive; had we required
long records of uninterrupted participation, few respondents would have qualified.
Table 2 shows how this selection was accomplished and with what results. Using the
forecasts of spending on consumer durables for 1968-81, the number of respondents fell
from a total of 156 to 86 in the sample, but the average number of surveys covered per14
respondent was greatly increased (e.g., doubled from 11 to 22 according to the medians).
Theaveragenumber of respondents per survey was reduced but slightly, remaining above
40. The variability of coverage over time was lowered considerably throughout (cf. columns
I and 2).
The participation rates in the surveys were much smaller in 1981-90 than in 1968-81.
In terms of the forecasts of real nonresidential investment, the number of respondents fell
from a total of 74 to 29 in the sample. Again, however, the selection process achieved
relatively good results. The retained forecasters averaged about 20 surveys, more than
double the number for all survey participants. The
respondent declined just from 21 to 18. Here too
all substantially reduced (cf. columns 3 and 4).
Finally, the sample for the total period
unemployment rate, consists of 111 out of a total of
per respondent ranges from 10 to 70, with a mean
for respondents per survey are 12-67 and 37. Here
median number of surveys covered per
the relevant dispersion measures were
1968-90, based on forecasts of the
159 persons. The coverage of surveys
of about 28; the corresponding figures
the dispersion statistics show relatively
small declines in the
turnover among the
when looking at the
transition from all" to "sample" (cf. columns 5 and 6).
survey participants was considerable, which should be
results of our study.7
All in all, the
remembered15
3.2Forecasters'Affiliationsand Methods
In1968-80thequestionnaire asked the participating forecasters about their primary
affiliation but later the question was dropped. As illustrated in table 3, academic
economists represented on average about 7 percent and government economists about 8
percent of the membership (lines 5 and 6). All other respondents, exceptfor a few from
labor unions and trade associations, came from the business world. Manufacturing
accounted most of the time for at least one third and up to 40% of the participants;
commercial banking and other financial institutions for one fifth or more; consulting and
research firms also for 20% or more in 1975-80,lessin earlier years (lines 1-4).
These distributions resemble those for the universe of business forecasters as
represented by the respondents to the annual economicoutlook surveys of the National
Association of Business Economists in 1975-89. Here from one third to more than40%
of respondents were in the industrial economy (manufacturing, energy, utilities),25-30% in
finance, 12% or more in consulting and research, 4% in other private services,and 6-12%
in government and academia. The assessments of some of the NABE surveyslooked for
but found no systematic differences in forecasting performance between these industry
groups.8
Another question asked regularly through 1981 concerned the relative importance
the survey participants assigned to each of several items on a short list of forecasting
methods or tools. Business economists use a variety of procedures to predict the major16
expenditure components of GNP, combine these predictions in nominal and teal terms, and
check and adjust the resulting forecasts for consistency with logic, theory, and the currently
available information. This "informal GNP model' is an eclectic and flexible approach with
large elements of judgment (Butler and Kavesh 1974). Over 70% of the NBER-ASA
survey respondents reported using it and over 50% on average ranked it first (table 4,
column 1). About one-fifth of the group favored econometric models, whether own or
outside, and one-fourth had their own econometric models (not necessarily comprehensive
and first-ranked). Users of outside models accounted for more than 40% of the early
members and more than half of those in the late 1970s and early 1980s (columns 2 and 3).
Leading indicators were employed by about 70% of the survey membership in 1968-
70 but later that share declined closer to 50%. They were ranked second by most
respondents. Similar majorities referred to anticipations surveys, which generally were given
lower ranks. Other methods, such as time-series models, were specified by fewer than 20%
of the participants and preferred by about half of them (columns 4-6).
These findings leave no doubt about one point, namely that the listed methods were
predominantly used in various combinations. Very few individuals preferred any one of
them so as to exclude the others. Presumably there is a good reason for this in that the
different methods tend to complement each other. For example, new reading on monthly
cyclical indicators and the latest results from an investment or consumer anticipations survey
may be used to modify forecasts from econometric models or the informal approach.17
There seems to be little or no systematic relation between the forecasters' rankings
of the methods and the accuracy of their predictions, allowing for the difference between
the targeted variables, spans, etc. This is suggested by cross-sectional (survey by survey)
regressions of individual forecast errors on dummy variables representing the first-ranked
methods as well as by comparisons of properly standardized average errors over time
(Zarnowitz 1971; Su and Su 1975). The lower panel in table 4 (lines 5-8) presents average
root mean square errors (RMSEs) for groups classified by their self-declared
methodological preferences. These measures are based on a large number of individual
forecasts of rates of change in nominal and real GNP, IPD inflation, and the levels of the
unemployment rate; they omit occasional forecasters and aggregate across predictions for
the current quarter and three quarters ahead. The differences between the RMSEs are
generally small and of uncertain significance.9
3.3 Basic Measures of Error in Forecasts of Changes and Levels
Forserieswith upward trends, e.g., GNP in current and constant dollars and the
implicit price deflator, the most relevant forecasts are those of percentage change. Let the
current survey quarter and the four quarters that follow be denoted by t = 1,...,5,
respectively. The most recent quarter for which data are available precedes the date of the
survey (t = 0). Then the predicted average changes refer to 0-1, 0-2, ... 0-5,and the
implied marginal (or intraforecast) changes refer to 0-1, 1-2, ... 4-5.18
For approximately stationary series such as the unemploymentrate, real inventory
investment, and real net exports, the most relevant forecasts are those of levels in the
original units. They refer to quarters 1,...,5.
Our data consist of more than 17,000 individual time series of forecasts definedby
source, variable, and horizon. For example, for 1968-90, there are 111 respondents in our
sample, reporting on seven variables over five spans each, which yields 3,885 series (111
x 7 x 5; but consideration of four marginal changes for five of these variables adds another
subset of 2,220 series). The tables below record the distributions of thesummary measures
of error across these individual series for each variable, period, and horizoncovered. We
distinguish three measures - the mean error (ME), the mean absolute error (MAE), and
the root mean square error (RMSE)— and compute for each several location anddispersion
statistics.These include means, standard deviations, medians,interquartile ranges,
skewness, and kurtosjs (denoted by M, SD, MD, bR, SK, and KU,respectively). Not all
the detail of this compilation can be presented here, ofcourse, but it is available for
purposes of verification and further research.
3.4 Data Revisions and Forecast Accuracy
Some of the variables covered by thesurveys, such as the consumer price index and
the interest rates, are subject to few or no revisions.Others, notably the aggregates and
indexes taken from the national income andproduct (NIPA) accounts, are revised19
frequentlyand some of the revisions are large. An old but still controversial issue iswhich
revisionor vintage of such data should be used in evaluating the accuracy of forecasts. The
preliminaiy figures are most closely related to the latest figures that were available to the
forecasters, but they may themselves be partly predictions or °guesstimates" andmay
seriously deviate from "the truth" as represented by the last revision of the data. On the
other hand, the final data may be issued years after the forecastwas made and may
incorporate major benchmark revisions. That the forecasters should he responsible for
predicting all measurement errors to be corrected by such revisions, is surely questionable.
Appraisals of forecasts differ: some are based on early data (e.g., Zarnowitz 1967),
others on late data, generally pre-benchmark revisions (e.g., McNees 1979; Zarnowitz1985).
Judgmental forecasts that rely heavily on recent preliminaiy figuresmay look best when
compared with early data; econometric model forecasts that incorporate long series of
revised data may be more favored by evaluations using latervintages.
Table 5 shows, for the NBER-ASA percentage change forecasts of GNP,RGNP, and
IPD,the MAEsand RMSEs obtained by comparisons with 15-day, 45-day, earlyJuly, and
late July data. In general, the errors tend to increasemonotonically the more revised the
data are, but there are exceptions. However, the differences between the successiveerror
measures in each segment and column of the table are relatively small, typically less than
1/10 of one percent. This is fortunate because it suggests that the choice of whichvintage
of the data to use may not be so critical. But larger differencesmay occur in particular20
suhperiods and offseteachother over the total period covered. Our results certainly do
not detract from the importance of measurement errors in theforecasting Context, which
has been demonstrated to be large (Cole 1969).
To save space and avoid relying on the extremes of eithervery preliminary or
repeatedly revised data, we shall henceforth use the 45-day estimate in most of our text
references and all of our tabular presentation. But no single datavintage is an optimal
standard here; the choice of any is inevitably more or lessarbitrary and too restrictive.
4. Forecasts of Nominal and Real GNP Growth and Inflation
4.1 Graphical Comparisons of Predictions
A convenient way to relate visually the distributions ofsurvey forecasts and the
actual data is to plot the former in form of box diagrams and the latteras a Continuous
series, quarter by quarter, to common scales. Charts 1-3 apply this device topredictions
of nominal and real GNP growth and JPD inflation rates. There isone graph for each
variable and horizon. The midpoint of each box marks the location of thegroup's mean
forecast, the top and bottom mark the mean one standard deviation. Alonger vertical
line bisects each box and connects the highest and the lowest forecastsrecorded on the
same occasion. A heavy curve superimposed upon thearray of the boxes and vertical lines
represents the actual outcomes (45-day estimates).21
The graphs make it clear that the curves cross most of the boxes. Thismeans that
the realizations fall within I SD of the mean or 'consensus' predictions most of the time.
However, some large declines in actual values are widely missed or underestimated, which
shows up as boxes lying conspicuously above the troughs or valleys in the curves.Similarly,
widespread underpredictions of some large actual rises show up as boxes situated below the
local peaks for concentrations of high values. Occasionally, the actual wouldeven he
missed by all respondents to the survey, as seen in instances where the entire vertical line
of forecasts lies above or below the curve.
Theseerrorsare clearly associated with business cycles. Chart I shows clusters of
large overestimates of real GNPgrowthin all majorslowdownsand recessions covered:
1969-70,1973-74, 1981-82, and1985-86.It alsoshows clusters of large underestimation
errors in all recoveries and booms: 1972, 1975, late 1980,1983-84,and 1987. So
overprediction of growth occurs mainly when the economy weakens and declines,
underprediction when it strongly rises. Both types of error can be seen as particularly
pronounced and persistent in forecasts with longer spans.Overall, the errors of
overprediction in bad times tended to be larger than those of underprediction in good
times.
Chart 2 shows that inflation was attimeswidely underpredicted in 1969-71, even
though it was thenfairlystable. In 1973-74, a period of supply shocks and deepening
recession, inflation rose sharply and was greatly underestimated by most survey participants.22
Here the curves can he seen to rise above most of the boxes and even to peak above the
highest forecasts for the longer horizons. The same tendency to underpredict also prevailed
in 1976-80, though in somewhat weaker form. In this period inflation rose moregradually,
while the economy first expanded vigorously and then, in 1979-80 experienced another oil
shock, a slowdown, and a short recession. In between, during the recovery of 1975-76,
inflation decreased markedly and was mostly overestimated. Another, much longer
disinflation occurred in 1981-85, a phase which followed the shifts to a tightmonetary policy
in late 1979 and included the severe 1981-82 recession and then a strongrecovery. Here
again most forecasters are observed to overpredict inflation. Finally, in 1986-89 inflation,
which began to drift upward, was generally well predicted most of the time (except in the
mid-quarter of 1987 when it dipped suddenly and was overestimated).
In sum, there is also a cyclical pattern to the errors of inflation forecasts.
Accelerated inflation was associated predominantly with under-prediction, disinflation will
overprediction errors.
Chart 3, which compares the forecast distributions and actual values for nominal
GNPgrowthrates, shows a broad family resemblance to the corresponding graphs for real
ON? growth in Chart 1.For example, both nominal and real growth tended to be
underpredicted in such boom years as 1972 and 1983 and overpredicted in such recession
years as 1974 and 1981-82. But inflation expectations and their relation to real growth
forecasts are also important here. Predictions of nominal GNP are oftenhelped by inverse23
correlations between the changes in IPD and RGNP, and the associated offsets between
the forecast errors for the two variables. (This has been noted before, see Zarnowitz 1979,
p. 15.) Thus, in the inflationary recession of 1973-74 associated with the first occurrence
of major supply and oil shocks, real growth was overpredicted and inflation underpredicted.
The reverse combination of too low RGNP and too high IPD forecasts can be observed in
the recoveries of 1974 and 1983-84. However, there are also episodes of positive
correlation, e.g., in 1981-82 both real growth and inflation were overpredicted, which
resulted in nominal growth forecasts that turned out much too high.
4.2 Distributions of Summary Measures of Error
Table6presents the statistics on the distributions of the mean errors in the sampled
NBER-ASAsurvey forecastsof GNP,RGNP, and LPD. For theforecasts of average
changes in GNP,themeans are all negative, but the corresponding medians have mixed
signs. Theaveragesfor the marginal changeerrorsarepredominantlypositive.The
dispersionmeasures(SD andLOR)areverylargerelativetothe averages.Thus, these
statistics(line1-4) fail to showclearlyany dominant under-oroverprediction bias. Similar
observations can bemadeabout the real GNPforecasts(lines7-10).However,
underestimationerrors definitely prevail intheinflation (IPD)forecasts.Hereallthe
averages, M and MD, are negative, and the relativesizeof the corresponding SD and IQR
figures is less.24
The M andMD statistics tendtoincrease monotonically in absolute value with the
lengthofthe span, strongly for the forecasts of average change, less so for those of the
marginalchange.The SD and IOR statistics tend to be muchlargerthe longer the span
andthemore remote the forecast target, for each of the three variables. (Cf. lines 1-4, 7-
10, and 13-16.)
There is evidence that the distributions for GNP and RGNP are skewed to the left
(i.e., SK < 0), with medians larger than the means. For IPD, SK is very small throughout
and M and MD are very close. (Cf. lines, 5, 11, and 17.)
The distributions for GNP and RGNP show large values for kurtosis,indicating the
presence of long thick tails (for the normal distribution, KU = 3). Again, the situation is
very different for JPD where the KU statistics are very low. (Cf. lines 6, 12, and 18).
Tables 7 and 8, each of which has the same format as table 6, show the distribution
statistics for the mean absolute errors and the root meansquare errors, respectively. The
RMSQs are, of course, larger than the corresponding MAES, and the statistics in table 8
are generally larger than their counterparts
in table 7 (e.g., they average about 30-60% higher for the GNPmeasures). Otherwise, the
two sets have very similar characteristics, which can be summedup as follows.
For both the MAES and the RMSQs of the individual forecasts, themeans and
medians increase with the span regularly, strongly for theaverage changes, less so for the
marginal changes. The main reason is that errors cumulate over time,25
but it is also true that the more distant target quarters are predicted somewhat less
accurately than the near ones. The dispersion statistics SD and IQR also increase as the
forecast horizon lengthens, except for the marginal !PD errors.
SK > 0 everywhere here and the SK statistics are generally large for GNP and
RGNPbutsmall for IPD. Consistently, the MDs tend to be smaller than the MEs. The
distributions tend to be skewed to the right.
Several of the KU statistics for GNP and RGNP are quite large. Little kurtosis is
observed in the IPD forecasts, except for the shortest ones.
We conclude that the survey respondents tended to underestimate inflation but not
(or in any event much less) the nominal and real GNP growth rates. The IPD forecast
distributions were more nearly symmetrical and had fewer outliers than the distributions for
GNPandRGNP.
4.3Individual vs. Group Mean Forecasts
Combining corresponding forecasts that come from different sources or use different
techniques tends to produce significant gains in accuracy. This is by now well known from
many studies, including some based on the NBER-ASA surveys.'0 In what follows we
extend and update the evidence on this point.
Averaging all predictions in each survey for a given variable and horizon results in
a time series of group mean (or median) forecasts. These are often called "consensus"
forecasts, whether or not there is much actual consensus among the respondents. The
group mean predictions based on our GNP, RGNP, and IPD sample forecasts have26
considerablysmaller errors than the average individual respondent, as shownby
comparisons of the ME,MEA,and RMSE entries in Table 9 (ci. columns I and 4, 2 and
5, and 3 and 6). The absolute or squared errors tend to increase with thespan of forecast
for both individuals and group means, but less so for the latter.
Foreach individualtime series of forecasts, a series of group mean forecasts has
been computed with a strictly matching coverage in terms of thesurvey dates and target
characteristics. Table 10 shows the locational statistics for the distributions of the ratios of
the individual RMSEs to the correspondinggroup RMSEs. These measures indicate that
the group mean forecasts were more accurate than about 75% of thesampled respondents'
forecasts. Thus, most of the first or lower quartile (Q) ratios are close toone (but some
for RGNP are lower); most of the median (02) ratios are 1.1-1.2; andmost of the third or
upper quartile (Q3) ratios are 1.3-1.5 (cf. lines 2-4, 7-9, and 12-14). These distributions are
bounded from below (any ratio > 0) and are heavily skewed to theright (e.g., the entries
for the best forecasts in Table 10 are 0.5-0.9, those for theworst forecasts are 3-7).
The ratios of the individual to thegroup RMSES, unlike their numerators and
denominators, do not depend systematically on the length of the forecast or distance to the
target quarter. Also, the diversity of the individual forecasts bysource, variable, and
horizon is greatly reduced by the normalization with thegroup means. Thus, the ratios for
the same quartiles are not very different for GNP, RGNP, and IPD.27
4.4Some OverallAccuracyand Variability Measures
Thepreceding tables offer some insight into the structure of errors calculated from
the survey forecasts but not into their relative levels. The latter will he assessed by
comparisons with benchmark predictions from time-series models selected to fit the
characteristics of the variables concerned and with forecasts from other sources. But first
we take a quick look at the average values of the outcomes for the target series so as to
gain some idea about the orders of magnitudes involved.
Columns 7-9 in table 9 show, successively, the means, standard deviations, and root
mean squares of the actual percent changes in the targeted variables. The absolute values
of the average errors in the individual forecasts and, a fortiori, in the group mean forecasts
are generally very small compared with the average actual changes, particularly for GNP
and IPD (cf. columns 1 and 7). The average RMSES of the individual forecasts are about
30-37% of the RMSVs for the nominal GNP growth and inflation and 68-72% of the
RMSVs for the real GNP growth rates (cf. columns 3 and 9). The RMSEs of the group
mean forecasts are about 23-29% of the RMSVs for the nominal GNP growth and inflation
and 5 1-53% of the RMSVs for real GNP growth (cf. columns 6 and 9).
4.5 Have Any Forecasters Exceled Consistently?
Each forecaster in our sample of 111 was ranked by accuracy of his or her
predictions, separately for each forecast target as defined by the date of the survey (t),28
variable, and span (e.g. for the GNP 0-1 predictions made in 1970:1). Letbe the rank
of the i-th respondent in the timetsurvey, which increases from the smallest to the
largest squared error. The number of surveys covered per respondent (m3 varied widely
across the individuals, and the number of respondents per survey (n1) varied widely across
time (see table 2, column 6). In view of this variability, it wasnecessary to normalize the
ranks by the number of participants in the particular survey. This is done bycalculating
R, = lOOrd/nI. The best forecast in each set would have r11 = 1 and hence
= 100/n1; the worst forecast would have r, = n1 and hence R1100. This setup
permits us to consider the question: How stable were the accuracy rankings of the
forecasters over time?
When the ranks are aggregated across the corresponding sets for each individual,
measures of central tendency and dispersion are obtained that characterize the distributions
over time of the ranks. Thus, for a given variable and span, the overall rank of the i-tb
forecaster is R.1/rn R., and the corresponding standard deviation equals
fl/2
[1/rn - R J.We compute such means, SDs, medians, quartiles, andranges for
each of the 111 individuals covered. Table 11 presents simpleaverages of some of these
measures in columns 1-4. For example, the grand mean (M) in column 1represent
= 1/111R.. I I
In addition, columns 5-10 in Table 11 summarize the distributionsacross29
individuals of the mean normalized ranks R.. The selected statistics include SD,
quartiles, and extremes. For example, here SD = [1/111(R - )2 )•12(column 5).
The entries in column I are all very close: 53-55 for GNP, 52 for RGNP, 54-59 for
IPD.Thecorresponding medians (not shown) are similarly clustered but 1-2 points larger.
En fact, there is very little variation between the entries in any column of table 11. That
is, the distributions of the normalized ranks are very similar for any of three variables
covered, and for any of the five spans.
Typically, any forecaster would rank high at some times and low at others. Indeed,
the average range of 85-90 (column 4) is close to the maximumrange possible for the R1
ranks (which cannot exceed 99 and would not be much larger than 90 for relatively small
values of ne). The forecaster's rank would fall in the center half of the distribution (i.e.,
in the interquartile range IQR) nearly 50% of the time, and within SD of the mean
perhaps up to 66% of the time (columns 2 and 3). There is no evidence of a high
skewness or a high kurtosis in these distributions. To sum up, the forecasting performance
of any individual relative to others is likely to be highly variable over time.
On the other hand, the dispersion of the corresponding forecasts and their errors
across the individuals will tend to be limited by the commonality of the targets of the
forecasters, and of the information and methods available to them. The correlations
between the forecasters' errors are expected to be positive and may be high. Our measures
presumably reflect all these regularities. Interestingly, the standard deviations in column
2, are 26-28, those in column 5 are only 9-12 (note that the definition of the former30
includes time t explicitly, while the definition of the latter does not). Similarly, the IQRs
in column 3 are 45-50, those implied by columns 7 and 9 are 9-15; and the corresponding
total ranges are 85-90 and 30-59 (cf. columns 4 and 6-10). These numbers seem consistent
with the results obtained in some previous studies indicating that fluctuations over time
contribute more than differences across forecasters to the overall variation in forecast errors
(see Zarnowitz 1974, pp. 578-79).
For each of the forecast targets identified in lines 1-15 of table 11, the ranks
according to R1 form a relatively tight cluster between the values of Q1 and 03 that
average 47 and 59, respectively (columns 7-9). A quarter of the group performed poorly
relatively to the others, with R values ranging from well above 60 to 100 (columns 9-10).
However, our attention centers on the top-ranking quarter, with R values averaging in
the 30s and 40s (columns 6-7). The latter can be said to have exceled with respect to the
given categoiy of forecast targets.
All these subsets, of course, consist of individuals who are coded and identifiable.
It is important to ask next what the correlations of the ranks are between the different
variables and spans. For example, do those who predicted best the growth of real GNP
also tend to excel in predicting inflation? Do those who rank high in forecasting over the
shortest horizons also rank high in forecasting over the longer horizons?
Table 12 indicates that the answers to these questions are on the whole positive.
The correlations among our normalized ranks, both across the variables for eachspan (lines31
1-3)andacross the spans foreach variable (lines 4-13), are all positive and sufficiently high
notto be due to chance. Forecasters who predict relatively well (poorly) any one of these
targets are also likely to predict well (poorly) any of the other targets. Not surprisingly, the
correlations are higher the more closely related are the forecast targets. Thus, they are
higher for ON!' and RGNP than for RGNP and IPD, and higher for successive spans, e.g.,
0-1 and 0-2, than for more distant spans, e.g., 0-1 and 0-5. Similar results have been found
for other variables and periods, and for marginal as well as average change forecasts (cf.
Zarnowitz 1984,pp.17-19).
4.6ComparisonswithBayesianVectorAutoregressive (BVAR) Forecasts
Weuse a BVAR modelwithfivevariables:RON!', IPD, M2 (broad money supply),
LI (the composite index of leading indicators), and TBR (the three-month Treasury bill
rate). TBR is a level series, the others are seriesofgrowth rates. The model is estimated
on quarterly series, each taken with sixlags.The data are the presently available ones, i.e.,
they incorporate all revisions, and in this sense the forecasts based on them are cx post.
Buttheforecastsaregeneratedsequentially,using only the information preceding the date
ofthe forecast.
Unlike the forecasters who cantakeadvantage of the early information provided by
the monthlyandweeklytimeseriesreleasedduring the survey quarter, theBVAR model
does not drawon any such data. On the otherhand,unlike theBVAR model, which is32
based on the present, revised series, the forecasters work under the disadvantage of having
access only to the latest preliminary data, that is, data that contain measurement errors
which are yet to be eliminated by revisions.
Because the quarterly data for the survey quarter (1) are not known to the
forecasters, our first approach was to impute the same lack of knowledge to our BVAR
model. Here, then, the shortest prediction is for 0-1, the longest prediction is for 0-5. But,
as pointed out by Christopher Sims during the conference, this approach (now called
"variant A") ignores any effects on the survey forecasts of the most recent economic news.
Since the knowledge of the news on balance presumably helps the forecasters, variant A
in this respect handicaps our BVAR, as it would more generally any model based strictly
on quarterly time series only.
For thisreason,we also present the results of alternative calculations ("variant B"),
which assume full knowledge of the actual values in quarter 1, or effectively perfect
foresight. Here for 0-1 the error of the BVAR model is identically zero, and no
comparisons with the survey forecasts are available; the shortest prediction is for 1-2. Thus,
the two variants represent contrasting extremes: in A there is no knowledge, in B there is
full knowledge of period I values. Variant B handicaps the real-life forecaster who has only
partial and indirect knowledge of the target variables in the current (survey) quarter.
It follows that the truth about the relative accuracy of the individual forecasts from
the surveys and the BVAR forecasts falls somewhere between variants A and B. Table 1333
provides the evidence, showing in columns 1-3 that the measures of error of BVAR-A for
spans 0-1, 0-2, ...etc.are approximately equal to the corresponding measures of error of
BVAR-B for spans 0-2 0-3, ...,etc.,respectively (compare lines I and 7, 2 and 8, and so
on). As would be expected, the RMSE ratios in columns 4-8 are throughout lower for
variant A than variant B, when comparing entries for the corresponding spans (lines 2 and
7, 3 and 8, and so on). That is, variant B calculations show the BVAR model forecasts in
a relatively more favorable light then variant A calculations do.
We present the results for both variants of the retroactively used time-series models
for comparisons relating to GNP, RGNP, and IPD (this covers both our own and outside,
multivariate and univariate models). For the other variables, only variant A is used. The
"true" outcomes are probably more often than not closer to the variant A than to the
variant B comparisons because (1) the forecasters' information about the recent and current
developments is in fact quite limited and deficient, and (2) the forecasters use preliminaiy
data and the time-series models use revised data. When all is considered, it can be argued
that variant B handicaps the forecasters more than variant A handicaps the models.
The RMSE ratios in table 13, columns 4-8, indicate that at least 75% of the
individual forecasts of GNP, 50% of those of IPD, and 25% of RGNP were more accurate
than the variant A BVAR forecasts. Thus, the 03ratiosare less than 1.0 for nominal
growth and close to 1.0 for inflation. For real growth, the MD ratios approach unity at
spans of 2-3 quarters and exceed it at longer spans. The ratios based on the BVAR34
forecasts variant B still show most of the survey forecasts to be superior for GNP, butnot
for IPD or RON?. Here the ratios rise above 1.00 for all horizons at 03 for ONP,atMD
for IPD,andeven at 01 for RGNP.
The BVAR mean errors are all positive, unlike the MEs for the NBER-ASAsurvey
forecasts which are mostly negative for ON? and IPD, and mostly positive but somewhat
mixed for RGNP. (For this and the rest of the paragraph, see table 13, columns1-3, and
table 9, columns 1-6.) Comparisons of the MAEs and RMSEs of BVAR with the
corresponding measures for the average individual survey forecast produce a mixed picture,
depending on the series and criteria used. However, the comparisons with the group means
are generally adverse for BVAR of either variant.
Such variables as the leading index and the short-term interest rate actas strong
codeterminants of growth in total output, as suggested by regression estimates and out-of-
sample predictions with VAR models (Zarnowitz and Braun 1990; Zarnowitz 1991, chapter
11). Our findings here are consistent with these results. The BVAR forecasts of RGNP
perform relatively well, which holds a potentially useful lesson for the forecasters to take
proper account of these relationships. But the BVAR forecasts of GNP and IPD are
apparently much weaker.
4.7 Comparing Forecasts for the First and Second Halves of 1968-90
The period 1968:4-1979:3 was one of upward drifts and largeinstability in35
both inflationand unemployment;of business contractions in 1969-70 and 1973-75; of the
Vietnamwar and price control disturbances in the early years, and severe supply (mainly
oil-price)shocks in the middle and late years. The period 1979:4-1990:1 was one of more
successful attempts to slow inflation by restrictive monetary policy; of sharp rises in prices
and interest rates followed by downward trends in the wake of two back-to-back recessions
in 1980 and 1981-82; of a long expansion that followed, interrupted by slowdowns in 1984-
86 and 1989; of new trade and financial problems.It is of interest to ask how the
macroforecasts fared in these two so different periods of approximately equal length.
The errors of the individual forecasts from the NBER-ASA surveys were on average
larger in 1979-90 than in 1968-79 for GNP but smaller for IPD, judging from the
comparisons of the RMSEs in table 14, columns I and 5. For RGNP, the differences
between the two subperiods are small and mixed, depending on the horizon of the
forecasts.
The average individual to group-mean RMSE ratios differ little between 1968-79
(1.04j/g￿1.34)and 1979-90 (1.15 ￿hg￿1.31).They decreased somewhat in the
latter period for short ON? and RON? forecasts, increased more for longer IPD forecasts,
but remained approximately unchanged in most cases (cf. columns 2 and 6).
The individual-to-BVAR RMSE ratios for ON? rose from .6 or less in 1968-79 to
around .8 in 1979-90; those for RON? rose as well, from an approximate range of .6-1.0
to .9-1.2; and those for IPD declined from .9-1.0 to .6-.9 (columns 3 and 7). These i/by36
ratios, then, show that on average the NBER-ASA survey forecasts outperformed our
BVAR forecasts, except for RGNP in 1979-90. The group mean predictions from the
surveys were throughout more accurate than BVAR, i.e., the ratios g/bv < 1 in all cases
(columns 4 and 8). M might be expected, the changes in i/by and g/bv between the two
subperiods paralleled each other directionally.
There is no evidence here that the forecasts on the whole either improved or
deteriorated in the 1980s as compared with the 1970s. The BVAR benchmark proved a
little more effective in 1979-90 than in 1968-79 for nominal and real GNP growth and
somewhat less effective for inflation.
5. Other Forecasts for 1968-90
5.1 Percent Change Forecasts: Industrial Production and Corporate Profits
Table 15 shows that the average errors of the forecasts of IP and CP tended to be
positive but widely dispersed and strongly increasing with the span (columns 1-3). The
RMSESincreasedsimilarly (columns 4-6). Comparisons with the average size and
variability of the actual changes(columns9-11) indicate a moderate level of accuracy for
the 11'forecastsbut poor overall performance for the CP forecasts (where the mean and
median RMSESexceedthe actual SDandRMSVvalues). The largepositive values of SK
andKUforthe IPpredictionsuptothree quarters ahead suggest skewness to the right and
fat tails; the latter may also characterize the longer CP predictions (columns 7-8).37
Combining the individual forecasts by simple averaging reduces the errors
substantially for IP (except for the longest span) but not for CP, where the gains from using
the group mean or consensus forecast are small (cf. table 15, columns 4 and 6, with table
16, column 1). Accordingly, the RMSEratiosj/g are smaller for CP than for IP; but it is
still true for both variables that only about the best 25% of the sample are more accurate
than the group mean forecasts (see table 16, columns 2-4).
The BVAR model forecasts (variant A only) outperform the group mean forecasts
for profits. The comparisons for the production index yield closer and mixed results, which
favor the survey group's predictions for the shorter and the BVAR predictions for the
longer horizons. (Cf. the corresponding entries in columns 1-4 and 5-8 of table 16.)
Both IF and CF forecasts had larger RMSEs in 1979-90 than in 1968-79 in almost
all cases (table 17, columns I and 5). Compared with BVAR, variant A, the survey
forecasts look better in the earlier than in the later subperiod, particularly for IP (cf.
columns 3 and 4 with columns 7 and 8, respectively).
5.2 Level Forecasts: Unemployment Rate and Housing Starts
For UR (table 18, lines 1-5), the mean errors are predominantly negative, suggesting
some underprediction, but they also show considerable dispersion. Level errors, unlike
average change errors, do not cumulate, but the RMSES still increase substantially with the
distance to the target quarter. The summary error measures are quite small relative to the38
statistics for the actual values of UR. Forshortforecasts, the distributions of the RMSES
are skewed to the right and have fat tails, judging from the large SK and KU values.
For HS (lines 6-10), the mean errors are close to zero and have mixed signs. They
do not depend on the distance to the target (unlike the mean errors for UR, which increase
with the distance). The RMSE and SD values, as usual, increase for the longer forecasts,
but they remain fairly small compared with the measures for the actual values of HS. The
SK and KU figures are small.
Combining the individual forecasts results in substantial gains in accuracy for both
variables but particularly UR (cf. table 19, column 1, and table 18, columns 4 and 6). The
RMSE ratios i/g are generally higher for UR than for HS, but once again the Q1 ratios
are close to one throughout, i.e., about 75% of the individual forecasts are less accurate
than the group means in either case (table 19, columns 2-4). The BVAR forecasts, variant
A, are about as accurate as the group mean forecasts for target quarters 3-5 of both UR
and HS; for closer targets, the comparisons favor thesurveys for UR and the BVAR for
HS (ci. the corresponding entries in columns 1-4 and 5-8).
Table 20 shows that the NBER-ASA forecasters on the whole predicted UR
somewhat better, and HS somewhat worse, in 1968-79 than in 1979-90 (cf. columns I and
5). The relative performance of the group mean vs. individual forecasts was very similar
in the two periods (columns 2 and 6); that of the BVAR variant A model improved in most
cases for UR but showed no systematic change for HS (columns 3-7 and 4-8).39
6. Comparisons with Selected Econometric and Time-Series ModelForecasts
6.1 The Michigan University Research Seminar in Quantitative Economics
The Michigan RSQE has the longest record of the several well-known service
bureaus working with macroeconometric forecasting models. RSQE kindly provided us with
the record of their forecasts, and we were able to compare them with the NBER-ASA
survey forecasts for ten variables.It is important to note that the quarterly Michigan
forecasts begin in 1970:4 and were not made in the first quarter in years 1975 and 1976,
and in the second quarter in years 1971-75 and 1977-79." We matched the Michigan and
theNBER-ASA forecasts periodby period. Further, the Michigan predictions were made
typically in March,June (occasionallyMay), August(rarelySeptember), and November (in
1974-75,December). TheNBER-ASAsurvey questionnairewasusuallymailed in the first
half ofeach quarterbutit was only in the last month of the quarter that all responses were
collected. Thus, at least some ofthesurvey forecasts had the advantage of later timing
(whichmeansmore potentially useful up-to-date information) vis-a' -vis the Michigan
forecasts.
Comparing the ME, MAE, and RMSE statistics for the Michigan and the NBER-
ASA group mean forecasts shows the latter to have been more accurate for GNP, RGNP,
and IPD (cf. columns 1-3 and 4-6 in table 21). Consistent evidence comes from the RMSE
ratios that have ranges of approximately 0.7-0.9, 0.9-1.1, and 1.0-1.3 for 01, MD, and 03,
respectively (columns 7-9). Thus, generally about half or more of the individual forecasts
from the surveys were at least somewhat more accurate than the Michigan forecasts.40
The results for the other variables are mixed. As shown in table 22, the Michigan
predictions of real consumption show on the whole larger errors than the NBER-ASA
"consensus," but not by much and not for the longest horizon (lines 1-5). They are better
than 50% of the individual survey forecasts for the two shortest spans, and better than 75%
for the three longest spans. The comparisons for real nonresidential investment favor the
group averages by modest margins, except again for the longest span covered. For real
residential investment, the Michigan forecasts are definitely better than all but the shortest
group mean forecasts. National defense expenditures are predicted better by the surveys
through span 0-3 and better by Michigan for the two longer spans. More than half of the
RMSEratiosj/M for NFL, RFI, and DEFareless than one (lines 6-20).
Thepatternthat theNBER-ASA group meanforecasts have an edge for the two
shortest spans andthe Michiganforecastsfor the two longest spans holds for the
unemployment rate and the Treasury bill rate in table 23 (lines 1-5 and 6-10).Themiddle
span shows about equal RMSEs for the two sets. The corporate bond yield predictions
from Michigan outperform those from the surveys for all but the shortestspan (lines 11.15).
6.2 Sims' Probabilistic Forecasts
In addition to outside econometric model forecasts, we wished tocompare the results
of the NBER-ASA surveys to outside time-series forecasts. We are indebted to Chris Sims
for data on predictions from both a sophisticated BVAR and univariate ARIMA models.41
Recall that our own BVAR model used earher in this paper includes RGNP, IPD,
TBR,M2, and LI, plusthe variable predicted (if not one of the above). The Sims model
includes thefirstthree variables inourset,plussix others: Ml,UR, NFl, S&P 500stock
priceindex,acommodityprice index, andthe trade-weighted value of the dollar.12 It is a
nine-variable,five-lag model, whereasours is a five-or-six variable, six-lag model.
Sims model isan extension ofthe model constructed in 1980andused in quarterly
forecastingduring1980-86 by Litterman (1986). It is three variables larger than the original
Littermanmodel and itallows time-variationincoefficients,predictable timevariation in
forecasterrorvariance, and non-normalityindisturbances (Sims 1989).The modifications
giverise tonon-normal,nonlinear models and hence to considerable complications in
estimationandanalysis (SimsandTodd1991). The Sims model(like our own BVAR)
forecastsaresimulations of real-time forecasts in that they use only data from time periods
beforetheperiods to bepredicted.Butforseveral reasons, including the use of current
versionsofthe data, they are far from being true ex ante forecasts (again, the same applies
toour BVAR as well).
Inevaluating theBVAR forecasts(bothSims' andour own), weusedthecurrent
data, which is consistent withtheirconstruction andbelievedto be fair. Use of preliminary
figureswouldhave resulted infindinglarger errors.
Again,likefor our own BVAR(see table13 and textabove),thecomparisonsof
Simsmodel forecastwith the NBER-ASAsurvey forecastsfor GNP,RGNP, and IPD are42
presented in two variants A and B (table 24). For reasons already explained, variant A
favors the real-time predictions that incorporatecontemporary news evaluations, while
variant B favors the predictions based on the ex post constructed time-series models.
Using variant A, Sims' forecasts (S) are found to have on the whole larger errors
than the group mean forecasts from the NBER-ASAsurveys for both ON? and RGNP
(table 24, lines 1-5 and 11-15, cf. columns 1-3 and 4-6). The corresponding ratios
RMSEJRMSESarerelatively low, approaching 1.00 only for 03 (columns 7-9), which means
that most individual forecasts from the surveys are more accurate than the S forecasts. In
contrast, the S forecasts are considerably more accurate than the group mean forecasts for
IPD inflation, and here the RMSE ratios i/S mostly exceed 1.00, even forQ (lines 21-25).
Using variant B as a criterion (lines 6-10, 16-20, and 26-30), we still see thegroup
mean forecasts as retaining on balance an advantage over the S forecasts for ON?, but it
is a much reduced advantage and one essentially limited to thelonger spans. For RGNP,
the NBER-ASA consensus predictions are somewhat more accurate than the S model
predictions for the spans 0-4 and 0-5, whereas the opposite is true for the shorterspans.
For IPD, the S forecasts have smaller errors throughout. (Cf. columns 1-3 for variant B
with the corresponding entries in columns 4-6.) Looking at the RMSEratios, i/S (columns
7-9), we find them to exceed 1.00, that is, to favor the S model, for GNP at 03 only, for
RGNP at MD and Q3 and for IPD at 01, MD, and 03.43
Interestingly, the original Litterman BVAR performedrelatively well forreal GNP
and unemployment hut worse for IPD, which motivated both Litterman and Sims to make
changes designed to improve their inflation forecasts. But simulationsdisclosed"a tendency
for improvements in the retrospective forecast performance of the BVAR model for
inflation to be accompanied by deterioration in its performance for real variables' (Sims
1989, p. 1). A similar tradeoff was observed in the work with our own BVAR.
According to the measures in table 25 (based on the variant A only), most of the
NBER-ASA survey forecasts for the unemployment rate (1968-90), the Treasury bill rate
(1981-90),and therate of growth in real nonresidential fixed investment (1981-90)exceeded
the corresponding Sims model forecasts considerably in overall accuracy. This can be
concluded from both the comparisons with group mean predictions from the surveys (cf.
columns 1-3 and 4-6) and the low i/S ratios (columns 7-9).
The Sims model and our own BVAR forecasts have errors of generally similar order
of magnitude. The Sims predictions are more accurate for GNP and IPD, less accurate for
RGNP and UR. The results for NFl and TBR are mixed (favoring Sims at the two longest
horizons only).13
6.3 linivariate Time-Series Models
Predictions from ARIMA models make popular benchmarks for evaluating
forecasters' performance. We use ARIMASas specifiedin Simsand Todd1991,where44
they are reported to have worked well relative to the Simsian BVAR for financial variables
andbusinessfixed investment in 1980-90 (pp. 9-10). However, our measures show that the
BVAR forecasts by Sims had throughout smaller overall errors than the corresponding
ARIMA forecasts, whether the comparisons cover the variants A or the variants B (cf.
Table24 and 25, columns 1-3, with Tables 26 and 27, columns 2-4).
The results of comparing the NBER-ASA survey forecasts with their counterparts
of the Sims-Todd ARIMA type are less clear-cut. Most of the forecasters did better than
the time-series models according to the variant A calculations, as is evident from the
individual-to-ARIMA (i/A) ratios in columns 5-7 of Tables 26 and 27. But when variant
B is used, the forecasters are no longer clearly ahead for RGNP and fall somewhat behind
for IPD (Table 26, lines 16-20 and 26-30).
Beginning in 1976:2, Charles Nelson has produced ARIMA forecasts of rates of
change in nominal and real GNP and the implicit price deflator synchronously with other
real-time forecasts, updating them each quarter upon the announcement of the first
preliminary numbers for the preceding quarter. Comparisons with five econometric models
for the period 1976:2-1982:4 have shown these ex ante "benchmark" forecasts to be of
competitive accuracy (Nelson 1984). Since 1988, Frederick Joutz has been preparing the
ARIMA forecasts on a current basis (the same way as Nelson had before), and he kindly
let us have the results for the purposes of a comparative analysis.45
Table 28 shows that the NBER-ASA group mean forecasts(g)were on average
consistently more accurate than the Joutz ARIMA(J)forecasts (cf. columns 2-5 and 3-6).
The RMSE ratios g./J rose with the span from .73 to .88 for GNP and from .76 to .83 for
RGNP; they varied irregularly between .78 and .81 for IPD. The RMSE ratios i/J (columns
7-9) average .8-.9 for 01, 1.0-1.1 for MD, and 1.3-1.5 for 03. Our analysis confirms the
findings that these ARIMA forecasts are indeed competitive, and that their relative
accuracy tends to improve with their horizon for GNP and RGNP (but not for IPD, where
they are weakest).
7. A General Evaluation and Conclusions
In presenting and discussing more than 30 tables on multiperiod quarterly forecasts
for a score of variables by a total of more than 100 individuals, we had to make some hard
choices about which problems to confront and which measures to use. Forecasts for two-
thirds of the time series covered were treated less comprehensively and relegated to an
appendix, to make the paper easier to read. Even so, the inevitable abundance of detail
risks obscuring the overall picture. Therefore, lest we miss the forest for the trees, a
statement of general findings, conclusions, and qualifications is very necessary at this point.
1. The distributions of the error statistics show that there is much dispersion across
the forecasts, which typically increases with the length of the predictive horizon.
Forecasters differ in many respects and so do their products. The idea that a close46
"consensus" persists, i.e., that current matched forecasts are generally all alike, is apopular
fiction. The differentiation of the forecasts usually involves much more than the existence
of just a few outliers. However, it is also true that forecasters depend oncommon
information, interact, and influence each other. This naturally induces some common
trends. The more independent information the individuals possess, the more their
predictions can differ. Thus, a clustering of forecasts could be due either to genuine
agreement or common ignorance, while dissent may reflect uncertainty.'4
2. Errors of the average change forecasts cumulate over thespans O-1,...,O-5 with
great regularity for a variety of time series. To a large extent, this occurs because of the
progression to larger changes in the corresponding actual values. But the errors of
marginal change and level forecasts, too, often increase with the distance to the target
quarter, although by much smaller margins and with much less regularity. As might be
expected, the further out in the future the target, the less can be inferred about it from the
past and the worse it is usually forecast. The less random and more predictable the series,
the better this rule holds, in the sense that the forecasts will be more forward-looking and
more appropriately differentiated with the distance to the target period.'5
3. Macroeconomic variables differ greatly in forecastability. The more persistent
(autocorrelated) series are, of course, more accurately predicted than series with high
random variability. Thus, real GNP and consumption are far easier to forecast than
residential investment and, especially, change in business inventories.Inflation was47
underestimated and poorly predicted by most forecasters most of the time. Negative
correlations between RGNP and IPD forecast errors have long been observed (see
Zarnowitz 1979, table 4 and text), and offsetting performance for inflation and real
variables appears to be frequently encountered in studies of forecasting methods and
results.
4. A comparison of the summary measures of error for 1968:4-1979:3 and 1979:4-
1990:1 reveals no large and systematic differences that would indicate either deterioration
or improvement in the overall performance of the respondents to the NBER-ASA surveys.
The accuracy of GNP forecasts may have decreased somewhat but that of inflation forecasts
increased. The 1970s and the 1980s differed significantly in a number of economically
important dimensions, but it is difficult to say that either subperiod presented the forecasts
with definitely greater problems than the other. Each experienced two business recessions,
which is noted because previous research has shown that turning-point errors played a
major role in downgrading the forecasting records (for a recent summary, see Zarnowitz
1991).
5. Group mean forecasts are generally much more accurate than the majority of
individual forecasts. These consensus predictions are computed by simple averaging across
the corresponding responses to each successive survey; we made no effort to use other than
equal weighting. This paper, then, provides many examples of the rule that combining
forecasts often results in substantial improvements. The method is very accessible and48
inexpensive. The gains are enhanced by the diversification of the forecasts that are
combined, e.g., our group mean forecasts should be better, the more different and
complementary the information embodied in their components. For some variables and
periods the combinations work much better than for others. In principle, one would prefer
to combine the information in a single model rather than combine the forecasts. In
practice, the latter will typically be much easier.
6. Consider first comparisons with time-series models constructed on the assumption
that the last-known values of the variables concerned refer to the prior quarter t-1 (variant
A). The assumption is certainly valid for the quarterly variables in the real-time forecasts,
but it results in some bias against the time-series forecasts. Table 29 sums up the evidence
in form of the RMSEs averaged across spans. For the subset consisting of the median
individual and the consensus forecasts from the NBER-ASA surveys, the Michigan
econometric model, our BVAR (A) model, the Sims (A) probabilistic model, and the Sims-
Todd ARIMA (A) model (lines 1-4, 6, and 8), the consensus (group mean) survey forecasts
rank first for GNP and RGNP, and second for IPD (following the Sims (A) model).
7. The alternative assumption, that the last-known values of the variables refer to
the current quarter t (variant B) is rather strongly biased in favor of the ex post forecasts
with time-series models. The ARMSES are all much lower for the variant B predictions
than for their variant A counterparts (cf. lines 4, 6, and 8 wiht lines 5,7, and 9). When all
nine sets of forecasts listed in table 28 are considered, Sims (B) model ranks 2,2, and 1 for49
GNP, RGNP, and IPD, respectively. The corresponding ranks of BVAR (B) are also high:
3, 1, and 3. The NBER-ASA consensus forecasts are now almost tied for the first rank
with Sims (B) and rank only 3 for RGNP and 5 for IPD (cf. lines 2, 5, and 7).
8. Table 30 sums up the evidence on the comparative accuracy of the several sets
of forecasts included in this study, using the longest series of predictions available for each
variable. Here again, root mean square errors averaged across the spans serve as the basis
for ranking the forecasts, but only the variant (A) time-series predictions are used. By this
criterion, the group forecasts from the NBER-ASA surveys earned 10 first and 10 second
ranks for the 21 variables covered. The median individual forecasts ranked first or second
6 times, third 11 times, and lower four times. Our BVAR model had equal numbers of the
first, second, and third ranks (5 each), plus six lower ranks. The Michigan (RSQE)
forecasts, available for 10 variables, ranked first and second four times and once, third and
fourth three times and twice, respectively. Sims probabilistic model forecasts, available for
six variables, were mostly less accurate, and the AREMA model forecasts were throughout
least accurate.
9. Finally, Table 31, using sums of the ranks across variables, shows that the group
(consensus) forecasts from the survey performed best overall in eachof the periods
covered; the Michigan forecasts were second best; the median individual forecasts,BVAR
model forecasts, and the Sims forecasts share mostly the ranks 3 or 4 (there are ties);and
the ARIMAs rank last. Note that major deviations from this ordering appear for some50
variables, notably Michigan is best for UR, Sims for IF. Also, these results conceal the
differences between the forecast horizons, which are sometimes important (e.g., the
Michigan forecasts would rate higher for the longer, lower for the short, spans).
10. It is important to emphasize that these comparisons concentrate on only one
aspect of the forecasts and need not imply an overall superiority of any of them. For
example, the econometric and time-series models are clearly much better defined, more
explainable, replicable, and internally consistent than the survey forecasts. But the survey
data collectively embody a great deal of apparently useful knowledge and information
available to professional forecasters. An interesting project, which must be left for future
research, would be to identify the best of the individual forecasts from the surveys, and to
combine them with each other and with very different model forecasts. Regressions of
actual values on predictions from different sources and models would serve as one method
for implementing this objective. Given rich data from active forecasters and interesting
models, studies of this type should yield useful lessons.51
Footnotes
1.Interestingly,the Morgenstern and Grunberg-Modiglianipapers are in a sense
precursorsof the contemporary rational expectations models in which behavior
follows forecasts that are consistent with the assumptions of the models and free
of any systematic errors.
2. The same applies to the literature on microeconomic prediction, which is
additionally restricted by the fact that much of the material on microforecasts
is confidential.
3.Forecasts of a Yale service developed by Irving Fisher were not better in 1929
than those of the Harvard service developed by Warren Persons (see
Dominguez et al. 1988).
4.Later studies of the Livingston forecasts generally used them as amended by
Carlson, but many earlier studies suffer from measurement errors in the
published group averages.
5.The B&E Section had long been engaged in producing annual surveys of
forecasts by its members.
6. The committee was established with the support of the B&E section of the
ASA and its 1980 and 1981 chairmen, Arnold Zellner and George Tiao. The
members included Rosanne Cole, Ray C. Fair, Edgar R. Fiedler, Albert A.52
Hirsch, F. Thomas Juster, Geoffrey H. Moore, George L Periy, W. Allen
Spivey, and Victor Zarnowitz. For more detail Ofltheseinitiatives, see
Zarnowitz 1982, pp. 11-13.
7.Missing observations (gaps in response) limit our ability to use these data to
study such problems as the dependencies over time in the forecast errors (but
see Zarnowitz 1985, section 3).
8. We are indebted to David L Williams, Secretary-Treasurer of the NABE, for
helpincollecting the data used in the text paragraph above.
9.Most of these differences actually disappear when rounded off to one decimal
point. Providing detail by span of forecast and for some other variables would
not alter the picture significantly (see Zarnowitz 1983, pp. 84-85). However, it
is probably worth noting that the group ranking first the outside econometric
models had the smallest average RMSES for most variables (column 3). This
group included large companies using well-known econometric service bureaus
as well as their own staffs of professional economists.
10.See Zarnowitz 1984, which uses the data for 1968-79. An early demonstration
that simple averaging can reduce forecast errors is in Zarnowitz 1967, pp. 123-
126. For a survey of the literature, see Clemen 1989.
11. RSQE predicts normally eight times in each year.53
12. The data are generally expressed in log level form, except for TBR which was
not logged.
13. For the RMSEs of the BVAR forecasts, see Table 13, column 3 (GNP, RGNP,
IPD), and Tables 19, A.6, and A.8, column 5 (UR, NFl, and TBR, respectively).
14. Cf. Zarnowitz and Lambros 1987, a study which compares the point and
probabilistic forecasts from the NBER-ASA surveys. Time and space
restrictionsprevented us from includinginthispaper the survey
responses to questions on the probabilities of alternative GNP and IPD
outcomes and turning points. See also Braun and Yaniv 1991.
15.it should be noted that annual forecasts are generally more accurate than all
but the veiy short quarterly forecasts, owing to cancellation of errors for the
quarters within the year (Zarnowitz 1979). In this paper, annual forecasts are
not considered.
16. A few deviations from the rule appear in the longest forecasts, apparently due

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Listof Variables Covered in the N8ER—ASA Quarterly
Economic Outlook Surveys, 1968:6—1981:2 and 1981:3—1990:1
Unit Series Period Covered
Variable (Symbol) (R or N) Sourcebno. 68:6—81:2 81:3—901 £211?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1Crossnationalproduct(CNP) $bil.(N) 1. 200 1 1 ZA
2 CNP implicit price deflator (IPD) b.y.—100(N) 1 310 1 1z
3 CNP in constant dollars (RCNP) const.$bil(R) 1 50 1 1 ZA
4 Industrial production (IF) b.y.100(R) 4 47 1 1 ZA
S unemployment rate (UR) percent(R) 3 43 1 1 Iscel
6Corporate profitsafter taxes(C?) $bil.(N) 1 16 1 1x
7 Plant and equipment expenditures(PE)$bil.(N) 2 61 1 IA
8 Private nonfarm housing starts (HS) ar. ,mil.(R) 2 28 1 / )eai.
9 Change in business inventories (CBI)5bil.(N) 1 245 1 In].
10 Consumerexpenditures for durable
goods (CD) $bil.(N) 1 232 /
11National defense purchases (DEl) $bil.(N) 1 564 1
12Personal consumption expenditures
(PCE) const.$bil.(R) 1 231 1 ta
13 Nonresidential fixed investment
(NFl) const.$bil.(R) 1 86 1 IA
14Residential fixed investment (REX)conat.$bil.(R) 1 89 / Ia
IS Federal government purchases (FOP) const.$bil.(R) 1 263 1 ZA
16 State and local govt. purchases
(SLP) conat.$bLl.(R) 1 267 1t
17 Change in business inventories
(RCBX) const.$bil.(R) 1 30 1 lecel
18Net exports of goods and services
(MX) const.$bil.(R) 1 255 / Iaw.1
19Consumer price index (CU) percent change(N) 3 320 1 teal
20 Treasury bill rate. 3—month
(TRZ) percent(N) 4 114 1
21New high—grade corp. bond yield
(05%') percent(N) 5 116 ( lam].
Abbreviations: b.y. —baseyear; a.r. —annual rate; conat. $ — inconstant dollars.
—Real.N —nominal.
bSource 1—U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of Economic Analysis (SEA).Source2—U.S. Dept.
of Commerce. Bureau of the Census.Source 3 —U.S.Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics(BLS).Source6 —Boardof Covernors of the Federal Reserve Syatem (FRB).Source
5 —Citibanicand U.S. Department of Treasury.
As listed in the Business Conditions Disest (ECD) and the Survey of Current Business (SBC).
4As used in the computation of forecast errors. 16 —percentagechange.Table 2
NatA—ASA Quarterly Economic OutlookSurveys. All Forecasts end
SampledForecasts. Selected DisttthutionalStatistics.1968—90 and
Two Subperiods
Line Statistic 1968:4—1981:2 1981:3—1990:1 1968:4—1990:1
All Sampi.. All Sample Allsample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (S) (6)
Number of Surveys
1 Total number 51 51 35 35 86 86
2 Surveys per respondent:Mean 14.8 26.2 10.3 20.8 21.0 28.5
3 Standard deviation 13.0 10.4 9.9 7.5 16.1 13.5
4 Median 11 22 6 20 19 25
5 Incerquartil.e range 21 18 14.8 9.5 26 21
6 Maximum 46 66 35 35 70 70
7 Minimum 1 10 1. 10 1 10
NumberofResoondents
$ Total number 156 86 74 29 159 1.11
9Respondentsper survey:Mean45.8 40.8 21.7 17.2 39.0 36.8
10 Standarddeviation 14.5 11.3 5.9 3.3 15.9 14.1
11 Median 44 42 21 18 31 34.5
12 lnterquartil.e range 24 16 10 6 26.2 22.5
13 Maximum 86 61 33 22 78 67
14 Minimum 22 20 10 9 12 12
Note: The counts refer to theforecastsen.andtwo quarters aheadforthe following variables:
1968:4—1981:2(51 surveys): Consumer expenditures for durable goods (CD); 1981:3—1990:1 (35
surveys): Nonresidential, fixed investment (NFl); 1968:4—1990:1 (86 surveys): Un.aployaent rat.
(UR).The sampleincludes th. forecasters who participated in atleast 10surveysint.ras of
these observations (seeline 7).Table 3
PercentageDistributions of Respondents byPrimaryAffiliation.
FourNEER—ASAEconomic Outlook Surveys, 1968—80
OuarterlvSurveys
L.inePrimaryAffiliation December 1968December1970November1975November 1980
(1) <2) (3) (4)
1. Manufactuting 39.3 45.6 21.3 40.0
2Financial institutions 2.L1 ZLA 2Q2
3 Commercial banking 11.9 6.5 12.8 13.3
4 Other ..I 1Q._
S Consulting andresearch 11.9 10.9 23.6 20.0
6 Academic 7.1. 4.4 10.6 6.7
7 Coverrssent 8.3 8.7 8.5 6.7
8 Others _LLI ..Li 12 Li
9 Total present' 100.0(84) 100.0(46) 100.0(67) 100.0(30)
Az reported by the participants in the given survey (those who did not respond to the question
on primary affiliation are excluded).
avery few responsesfrom labor union and tradeassociation economists,but mainly Thor
elsewhere classified.i.e.. notincluded in thecategorieslisted above.
1otal number of respondentsis listedin parentheses. Thecomponentpercentages may not add
up exactly to 100.0 becauseofrounding.Table 4
AverageRanks and Accuracy of Forecasting Methods
Used in the M8ER—ASA Surveys. 1968—al.
Informal. Econometric Models Leading Anticipations Ocher
Line Statistic GNP Model Own Outside Indicators Surveys 1.thod
(1) (2) (3) 4) (5) (6)
Percent Using 75 24 48 62 57 16
2 I Ranking First' 55 11 9 11 2 8
3 1. Ranking Second13 7 15 29 21 4
4 1 Ranking Lowerd 6 7 25 22 35 6
Averse. Root Mean Square Error'
5 GNP. 1. changet .96 1.09 .89 1.00 .99 1.15
6 RGNP, I change 1.16 1.25 1.05 1.24 1.22 1.27
7 IPD. I change .71. .76 .72 .79 .85 .83
8 UP., level .53 .66 .52 .62 .71. .59
'Write—in but often not specified.
b8ased on seven surveys 1968:4—1970:2 (496 repLies). six surveys 1974:1—1975:2 (308 replies).
and six surveys 1980:1—1981:2 (187 replies), The August 1969 survey via held in connection with
the ASA annualmeetingand attracted a v.ry large number of respondents (128. including 46
regular panelists).Participation in the other surveys covered varied from 24 to 83.The
averagesare weighted according to thenumbersof th. replies.
'Mostimportant.
dRinks 3 to 6 (leastimportant).
Accerdingto first—tanked method (tiesforths first rank arenor included).Refers to 79
individuals who participatedin at least 1.2of the46 quarterlysurveys inthe period from 1968:4
through 1980:1. SeeZarnowits 1983for moredetail.
Symbols as defined in table 1.Table 5
Mean Absolute Errors and Root Mean Square Errors of Forecasts of
Nominal and Real GNP Growth and Inflation, Comparisons with
Different Vintages of Target Data, 1968—90
Error! by Sean (05)b Root Mean SquareErrors.by SDSn(OS'
0—3 0—4 0—5 0—10—2 0—3 0—4 o—s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8> (9) (10)
Gross NationalProduct(Qt4P)
Gross National Product in Constant Dollars (RGNP1













15—d.ay: preliminary datareleasedin the month following the target quarterofthe forecast.
generally first July revision: where
generally second July revision: where
bMean ofthe MA!s of the individual, forecasts, where MAE— 1/NZIEI; E —P—A; ? — predicted
value: A —actualvalue of th, givenvintage. The averageerrors refer to percent changes from
quarterc—I. (0) toquarters t, t+1, t+2, t+3. and t+4 (1.2.3. end 4), respectively,where t
refersto the quarterly date ofthe survey. Thu.s0—I denotes the change from quartert—1 to
qartert;0—2denotes the change from quarterc—i toquarter t+1: etc.Allmeasuresrefer to
percentchange errors endaceinpercent.
Mean of the RNSEsof the individual forecasts,where RMSE — Il/nI (P— A5).
Vintage ofMean Absolute









































45—day: revised data releasedamonthlater, Early July:
this is not available, the preceding revision. LateJuly:
this is not available, the preceding revision.Table 6
Distribution ofMean Errors in Individual Forecasta
ofNoaina1 and Real. CM? Crovth and Inflation, 1968—90
Aversee Errors by Soan (Os) Marelnal Errors, by Soan(Os)
LineStatistic 0—1 0—2 0—3 0—4 0—5 1—2 2—3 3—6 4—5
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5) (6)(7)(8) (9)
Cross Macionpi Product (CUP)
1 Mean (M) —.09—.11.—.11—.14—.30 —.01 .01 .04 .08
2Standard devia-
tion (SD) .26 .56 .911.191.61 .31 .38 .36 .37
3 Median(1(D) —05—.06 .04 .15 .00 .01 .06 .09 .13
4 Interquarcile
range (IQR) .24 .48 .72 .91.1.30 .27 .29 .31.31
SSkewness (SM) —1.94 —1.57 —1.60 —2.65 —2.78 —.55 —1.41 —1.64 —1.92
6 Kurtoais (KU) 12.1.4 12.42 11.90 12.81 13.80 10.898.498.508.66
Gross Macional Product in Constant Dollars (RCNP)
7Mean(H) —.01. .09 .25 .45 .48 .10 .16 .22 .28
8 Standard devia-
tion (SD) .24 .48 .771.061.39 .29 .35 .34 .43
9Median(MD) —.00.13 .34.62 .64 .10 .20 .27 .29
10tnterquartile
rang. (IQR) .27 ...6 .69.981.20 .28 .36 .38 .51
11 Skewness (SM) —1.30 —1.58 —1.84 —2.04 —2.06 —1.17 —1.75 —1.34 —.89
12Kurtoais(KU) 4.646.767.29 7.578.13 4.786.634.241.97
Teolicit Price Deflator (!PD)
13 Mean (H) —.07—.19—.36—.57—.65 —.12—.15—.19—.21
1.4Standarddevia-
tion (SD) .16 .34 .57 .831.24 .20 .25 .27 .35
15 Median(MD) —.07—.17—.34—.54 —.74 —.11—.14—.16—.21
16 Interquartile
rang. (IQR) .15 .39 .751.091.79 .27 .35 .36 .52
17 Skewness (SM) .06 .32 .09 .14—.06 .28 ...10 .26 .04
18 Kurtosis (KU) 1.35 .76 .50 .92 —.11. .42 .36 1.91.—.24
MOTE: Colwuns 1—5 refer to theerrorsin forecasts of average changes; coluana6—9refer tothe
errors in forecast of earginal changes (for 0—1.theaverageandearginzl. changes aretheea.).
ME. SD. MD, and IQR (lines 1—4,7—1.0.and 13—16) ar.inpercentagepoints;.ntries for SM and
KU(lines5—6, 11—12. and 17—18) aredjecnsjonjesaratios. IQR.— Q— Q is thedifference.
thirdquartileainus first quartile of the distribution (where MD —03).SM —/ois the ratio
of the third eoent around the nean to the third powerofthe standard deviation SD —o.KU —
istheratio of th. fourth monent around theesan tothe fourth power of SD.Tabl. 7
Distributionof Mean Absolute Errore in Individual. Forecasts
of Nosinal. and Real. GM!' Growth and Inflation, 1968—90
Averpee Errors by Span (Ouarters) Mareinal Errors, by 5ppn(Qs)
LineStatistic 0—1. 0—2 0—3 0—4 0—5 1—2 2—3 3—4 4—5
(1.)(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)(7) (8) (9)
Cross National Product (GWP3
1Mean(N) .621.12 1..601.992.48 .76 .84 .85 .88
2 Standard devia-
tion (SD) .23 .43 .64 .811.12 .22 .23 .23.26
3 Median (MD) .561.021,491.842.31 .73.81.82 .86
4Incerquartile
range (IQR) .28 .39 .41 .61 .98 .20 .22 .26.28
S Ske.meaa (SK) 1.692.383.113.513.85 1.611.691.161.11
6 Kurtosis (KU) 4.188.2113.3118.7922.53 4.155.442.462.21
Gross National Product in Constant Dollars (RCNP')
7 Mean (N) .641.091.562.002.47 .78 .85 .93 .96
8 Standard devia-
tion (SD) .23.37 .51 .63 .84 .20 .20 .24 .26
9 Median (MD) .591.001.411.822.26 .76 .82 .92 .94
10 Interquartila
range(IQR) .22.33 .46 .63 .89 .29 .29 .34 .33
11 Slre,,n.sa(SK) 1.591.771.821.761.92 1.09 .70 .30 .33
12 Kurcosis (KU) 2.894.124.1.24.136.12 2.20 .87 —.1.8.36
tanlicit Price Deflator (IPD)
13 Mean (K) .42 .771.161.632.14 .50.56.61.65
14 Standard devia-
tion (SD) .13 .23 .35 .45 .59 .1.2 .13 .16.18
15 Median(MD) .38 .721.081.552.07 .49.54.57.62
16 Xncerquartile
range(IQR) .14 .23 .47 .51. .69 .15.18 .16 .19
17 Sks'nesa(SK) 1.841.291.11 .71. .64 .851.171.11.98
18 Kurtesia (NIl) 4.532.51.2.21 .85 .84 1.361.252.201.76
NOTE:See table6.Eab1e 8
Distribution of Root MeanSquare Errorsin Individual. Forecasts
of Noina1andReal CM?Crowth andInflation,1968—90
Averase Errors by Span(Os) MereinalErrors,by Sppn(Os)
LineStatistic 0—1 0—2 0—3 0—4 0—5 1—2 2—3 3—4 4—5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Cross National Product (CM?)
I Mean CM) .81 1.452.072.58 3.20 1.021.12 1.1.3 1.19
2 Standard devia-
tion .30 .55 .76 .92 1.25 .31 .30 .30 .38
3Median (MD) .76 1,331.932.45 3.06 .97 1.1.0 1.11.1.14
4Incerquarcil.o
range(IQR) .38 .47 .61 .69 1.14 .25 .29 .39 .40
S Skewness(SM) 1.202.172.362.34 2.43 1.631.34 .551.51
6 Murtosis (KU) 1.526.48 7.329.4710.59 3.973.65 .064.61
Cross National Product in Constant Dollars (1CM?)
7 Mean Of) .85 1.44 2.082.74 3.38 1.05 1.1.61.271.32
8 Standard devia-
tion .35 .49 .67 .82 1.04 .31 .28 .33 .38
9 Median (MD) .77 1.321.902.57 3.12 .98 1.1.51.261.31
10lnterquarcile
range (IQR) .36 .54 .80.83 1.18 .38 .39 .50 .51
11Skewness(SM) 1.781.541.541.30 1.22 1.37.47 .18 .46
12 Kurtosi (KU) 4.02 3.423.292.041.90 3.08 .20—.11 .86
Implicit Price Deflator (IPD)
13Mean(M) .54 .99 1.502.10 2.79 .65 .72 .79 .85
1.4Standarddevia-
tion .19 .32 .43 .57 .75 .20 .18 .24 .25
15 Median(MD) .47 .911.432.06 2.79 .61..70 .74 .81
16 Incerqu.arttle
range (IQR) .18 .30 .55 .79 1.08 .22 .24 .22 .33
17 Skewness(SM) 1.821.44 .89 .54 .18 1.44 .94 1.51.1.21
18 Kurtosis (KU) 3,352.781.151.06 —.04 3.001.584.193.64
NOTE:See Table 6.table 9
Individual, and Group Mean Forecasts and Actual Values of
Nominal and Real GM? Growth and Inflation. Selected Statistics
on Accuracy and variability. 1968—90
Individual Forecasts'Crouo Mean Forecastsb Actual Values (XA)c
Line Span(Qa) N MAE RI4SE N MA!RNSE K SD RMSV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Cross National Product (GNP)
1 0—1 —.09 .62 .81 —.08 .49 .64 1.98 .96 2.20
2 0—2 —.111.121.45 —.10 .841.11 4.001.00 4.31
3 0—3 —.111.602.07 —.071.221.61 6.072.14 6.44
4 0—4 —.141.992.58 —.02 1.562.06 8.202.63 8.61
5 0—5 —.302.483.20 —.091.912.51 10.38 3.12 10.84
Gross National Product in Constant Dollars (RCNP)
6 0—1 —.01 .64 .85 —.02 .50 .64 .611.03 1.20
7 0—2 .091.091.44 .02 .831.11 1.231.77 2.16
8 0—3 .251.562.08 .161.171.61 1.862.40 3.04
9 0—4 .452.002.74 .331.422.05 2.502.95 3.87
10 0—5 .482.473.38 .401.702.47 3.15 3.45467
Imolicit Price Deflator (IPO)
11 0—1 —.07 .42 .54 —.04 .28 .35 1.36 .65 1.51
12 0—2 —.19 .77 .99 —.12 .55 .70 2.741.25 3.01
13 0—3 —.36 1.161.50 —.22 .84 1.13 4.161.84 4.55
14 0—4 —.57 1.632.10 —.341.211.64 5.602.43 6.10
15 0—5 —.652.142.79 —.371.632.23 7.083.03 7.70
'Means of the corresponding statistics for individual forecasts (as shown in table 6—8, lines
1, 7. and 13, column,1—5).
bSurvey_by_survey consenaus" forecasts based on the sampled data, as explained in the text.
45—day estimates, asusedin tables 6—8. RNSV —rootmean square value computed as
+
NOTE:On the symbols used, see previous tables and text.Table 10
Individual to Group Mean Ratios of RootMeanSquareErrors.
Selected Distributional Statistids for Forecasts of Nominal and
Real CUP Growth and Inflation, 1968—90
Aversee Errors by Span (Os) Marsinal Errors. bySpan(Os)
Line Statistics 0—1 0—2 0—3 0—4 0—5 1—2 2—3 3—4 4—5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)



































Irst.licit Price Deflator (IPD)
cast (MIll)
12 First quartile (Q1)
13Median (MD)
14 Third quartile (03)
IS Highest—error
forecast (MAX)





NOTE: All entries show ratios RMSE/RN3E5. where the subscripts i and g refer to the individual
and group mean forecasts, respectively. HIM and MAX denote the lowest and highest ratios in each
distribution, QandQdenotethe lower and upper quartile ratios, and MD denote the median
ratios.
Lowest—error fore-















Ranking Fer.cascersAccording to TheirAccuracy in Predicting Nominal
endRealCNPand Inflation Rates.Selected Measures, 1968—1990
Span
Line(Quarters)
Distribution Over Tim.of Individual
Normalized Ranks (R1.)— Means of
K SD IQP. Range
(1) (2)(3) (4)
Distribution Across Individuals of Mean
Normalized Ranks (Ri)
SDKIN Q MD
(5) (6) (7) (8)






53 27 46 87
53 27 46 87
53 27 46 88
53 27 46 86
53 26 45 85
10 38 68 53 59 95
11 32 45 51 59 98
11 36 46 51 58 100
11 33 47 52 58 99
12 30 66 51 58 100





10 0—5 52 28 48 86
9 29 47 52 56 77
10 30 47 51 57 94
9 35 46 51 57 89
9 34 45 51 58 87
10 31 65 51 57 99
Inolicit Price Deflator (IPD)
59 28 68 89
56 28 48 89
55 28 47 88
54 28 46 88
54 27 46 86
10 40 52 57 65 93
10 39 49 56 62 95
10 33 48 54 60 98
10 29 48 54 60 93
11 29 45 54 59 96
NOTE: The basic unit of measurement is the normalized rank RL —lOO(rJn),.,h.re r —rank
of the i—rh forecaster in time tsetof predictions for a given variable and span, and ns —
numberofforecastersin the same set. The ranks are,assignedaccording to the squared errors
(P —A)2,fro. the smallest to largest.Theentries incolumns 1—4 represent the means of the
summary measuresforthedistributions of the individu.e1s ranks over time (e.g.. K in column 1
refers to R —1/n where Ri —I/n similarly for the standard deviations in columns
2,etc.) The entriesincolumns 5—10 characterize thedistributionsacross the individuals of

















Respondents to NBER—ASASurveysRanked According to the
Accuracy of Their Forecasts of o.ina1 and Real GHPGrowth
and IPD Inflation Rates:Correlations Amongthe Ranks,
AcrossVariables and Horizons,
1968—1990
LineVariables Correlated for Forecast Horizons (in O,.srrpts) --
(1.) (2) (3) (4) (5)
I GN, RCNP .73 .74 .68 .64 .64
2 CNP, IPO .56 .64 .68 .59 .59
3 RGNP, IPD .47 .52 .54 .51 .42
Horizena Correlated for Variables
_.Qli... RCNP IPD
4 0—1, 0—2 .82 .77 .79
5 0—1, 0—3 .73 .68 .65
6 0—1,0—4 .68 .67 .51
7 0—1. 0—5 .73 .62 .47
8 0—2, 0—3 .87 .87 .83
9 0—2. 0—4 .75 .74 .75
10 0—2, 0—5 .79 .72 .67
11 0—3, 0—4 .92 .86 .92
12 0—3. 0—5 .87 .80 .86
13 0—4, 0—5 .92 .86 .92
NOTE: Thecorrelations ar, based on the notaliz.dranksdescribed in th. text
andTable 11.Onthesyba1s uzed, see previous tables and text.Table 13
BVARForecasts(Two Variants) vs. Individual Forecasts frog NBER—ASASurveys.







8VAR Forecasts•EMSERatios.Individual to BVARForecasts
M MAE RMSE KIN Q MD Q3 MAX
(1)(2) (3) (4) (5)(6)(7)(8)











































.32 .54 .66 .911.89
.34 .57 .68 .832.00
.38 .58 .70 .832.44
.26 .59 .68 .85 2.61.
.25 .54 .67 .822.41
Variant B






























































































2.94BVAR Forecasts •R1SERstioIndividuil to BVAForecascsb
Line Span(Qs) fl MAE R1SE MINQHQ MAX
(1)(2) (3) (4) (5)(6)(7)(8)
VariantB
26 0—1 0 0 0 na.na.n.e.n.a.na.
27 0—2 .04 .37 .47 .70 1..071.23 1.51.3.69
28 0—3 .10 .76 .97 .71 .951.09 1..302.83
29 0—4 .16 1.17 1.53 .57 .981.101.242.56
30 0—5 .211.642.18 .61 .951.081.244.23
Bas.dena od.l with five variables(RON?.IPD, M2, LI. and TBR) and six
quarrarly lags, esti.ated sequentially .,ithpresentlyavailabledata.Variant A
assuaathatthe last knownvaluesof th. variablestobepredictedrefer to the
quarter t—l (denoted 0);variantB assumesthat they referto the current qu.artar
c (denoted 1).
wher,thesubscripts L refers to th. individual forecasts frea the
NBER/ASAsurveysand the subscript by retire to th, corresponding Bayesian vector
autoregressive (BVAR) forecasts (variant Ainlines 1—5. 11—15, and21—25;variant
BinLines 6—1.0, 16—20. and 26—30). MIN and MAX denote the lowest and highest
ratiosin eachdistribution, Qand04 denote the lower and upper quartileratios,
and MDdenotethe sedian ratios.Table 14
Individual. Croup Mean, and BVAP.Forecastsof Percent Changes in
CNP, RCNP. and IPD,SelectedComparisons by Span and Subperiods
1968—79and 1979—90
Forecasts For 1968:4—1979:3 Forecasts for 1979:4—1990:1






Cross National Product in Constant Dollars (RCNP)





















'Median of the root mean aquare errors of the
quaxterly N8—ASk surveys.
individual forecasts from the
hLaUo ofthemedianR1(SEofthe individual forecasts (t) to the RMSEofthe
correaponding group meanforecast(g) in coLumns2and 6. Ratio of the median
R(SEofthe individual forecacts (i) to the RMSEofthe corresponding BVARmodel
forecast (by) in columns 3 and 7. Ratioofthe P.MSEofthe group meanforecast

























































Selected Measures of Forecast Accuracy and Actual Values, Percent Changes
in Industrial Production and CorporateProfits,by Span, 1968—90
Mean Error Root Mean Square Error Actual Vplue
Line Span(Qs) M SD MD ft SD MD SK KU ft SD RMSV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Index ofIndustrialProduction (IP)
1 0—1 .04 .58 .02 1.661.081.547.8973.16 .76 2.17 2.29
2 0—2 .83 1.07 .30 3.131.802.937.6669.68 1.52 3.79 4.08
3 0—3 .67 1.58 .63 4.522.10 4.266.2852.71 2.28 5.04 5.53
4 0—41.041.901.09 5.45 1.355.34 .80 1.58 3.06 6.08 6.81
5 0—5 1.06 2.27 1.35 6.191.376.02 .36 1.05 3.83 6.95 7.94
Cororate Profits After Taxes (CP)e
6 0—1 .262.49—.02 9.502.039.39 .04 1.08 1.33 7.36 7.48
7 0—21.004.58 .76 14.422.86 14.71—.39 1.95 2.7811.13 11.47
B 0—3 2.586.542.64 18.583.32 18.75—.14 4.23 4.1713.54 14.17
9 0—44,118.204,39 22.384.29 22.58 .05 7.34 5.5515.56 16.52
10 0—56.299.666.61 26.304.94 26.47 .93 9.07 7.0117.82 19.15
Refsrstothe periodl970:l—19894.
bBasedon the second revision of the monthly data.
enthe first July revisionof the quarterly data.Table 16
Individual,GroupMean, and EVAR Forecastsof Percent Changes in
IndustrialProduction and Corporate Profits, Selected Comparisons.
by Span. 1968—90
Group Mean R1(SERatiosi/s BVAR RMSERatios i/by
LineSpan(Qa) WiSEQ MO Q3 WiSE Q1 MI) Q3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Index of Industrial Production (jp)b
1 0—1 1.17 1.131.26 1.54 1.56 .851.001.32
2 0—2 2.44 1.061.16 1.30 2.83 .90 1.041.45
3 0—3 3.50 1.071.16 1.28 3.66 .991.201.58
4 0—4 4.55 1.061.13 1.24 4.25 1.04 1.251.74
5 0—5 6.16 1.051.13 1.26 4.78 1.04 1.211.66
Coroorste Profits After Taxes (CP'
6 0—1 9.24 1.00 [.08 1.14 7.22 1.25 1.411.58
7 0—2 13.68 1.011.08 1.16 11.22 1.15 1.321.49
8 0—3 17.36 1.001.06 1.14 14.35 1.141.291.44
9 0—4 20.98 1.001.06 1.14 16.62 1.181.311.48
10 0—5 24.41 .981.05 1.12 19.16 1.14 1.331.51
For I?: Basedon a model with six variables (RGNP, IPD. Ff2, LI,TSR, and IP)
and six quarterly lags. estimated sequentially with presently available data.
For CP: Basedon a model withsix variables (RCNP. IPD. M2,LI,TSR. andCP)and
sixquarterly lags, estimated sequentially with presently available data. BVAR
variantA is used throughout.
onthe second revision of the monthly data.
Bssed on the first July revision of the quarterly data.NOTE: Subscripts
forecasts, variant A, respectively.
sampled for.casts (columns1.and 5).
matching observations, and th. i/by
individualforecasts usedineach
respectively).The g/bvratiois
notes to tables 1,3 and 14.
Table 17
Individual. Group Mean, and5VAForecastsof Percent changes in
Industrial Production and Corporate Profits, Selected Comparisons,
by Span and Subperiod, 1968—79 and 1979—90
LineSpan(Qs)
Median R!(SE Ratios Median
RHSEi/g i/byg/bv RMSEj/g














































i. g, and by refer tothe individual,group mean,and IVAR
RflSE isthemedian of the RuSEa of the
Thei,'g ratio isRMSE/RMSE1for strictly
ratio is R1(SE1/RI4SE, with medians of the
case (colu,anz 2 and6, and3 and 7,
RnSE1/RnSE (columns 4 and 8). Se. alsoTable 18
S.lecred Measures of Forecast Accuracy and Actual Values. Levelsofthe
Unemploys.entRaceandHousingStarts, byTarget Quarter. 1968—90
Root Mean Square Error
H SD MD 5K
(4) (5) (6) (7)
Actual Value
KU H SD LMSV
(8) (9) (10) (11)
Uneenlov.ent Rate(UR
HousinsStarts (HS)b
6aeed onpresentlyavailable data (no teportant revisions).
5ssd en the second revision of theaenthlydata.
Target Mean Error
























































2.45TargetGroup MeanRMSE Ratios i/s __________________









For IP: Based on a model, with aixvariables (RaN?,IPD, K2, LI, TBR, andUP.) andsix quarterlylags,eaciat.d sequentially with presently available data.
ForHS:Based onamodelwith six variablei(RCNP.XPD.M2, LI, TBR. and HS) and
sixquarterly lags,estimated s.qu.ntially withpresentlyavailable data.See textandappendix. BVAP. variant A isusedthroughout.
bBaSed on presently available data.
Bagedenascend revision of the monthly data.
Table 19









2 2 .41 1.051.171.32
3 3 .65 1.011.101.23









7 2 .25 1.001.07
8 3 .29 1.021,08
9 4 .33 .981.10
10 5 .36 .991.07Table 20
Individual.Group Mean. and BVARFor.casts of the UneeploytsentRate
and Housing Starts, Selected Coapariions, by Target Quarter and Subperiod
1968—79 and 1979—90
Forecastsfor196S:4—19793Forecasts for l9794—I99O:j
Target Median RNSE Ratios Median RuSE Ratios
Line Quarter R2tSEi/gi/byS/by RMSE1 hgi/byg/bv
(1)(2)(3) (4) (5) (6)(7)(8)
Uneeolovment Rate(UR
1 1. .21 1.34 .84 .58 .211.39 .82 .57
2 2 .45 1.15 .95 .80 .521.191.16 .84
3 3 .66 1.06 .98 .95 .831.101.391.03
4 4 .84 1.06 1.091.04 1.091.101.511.20
5 5 .96 1.081.111.02 1.281.091.711.37
HousinsStarts (HS
6 1 .23 1.07 1.581.39 .231.031.931.80
7 2 .30LOS1.391.24 .281.051.431.26
8 3 .37 1.101.271.14 .301.071.231.01
9 4 .42 1.081.111.07 .311.051.14 .98
10 5 .45 LOS1.011.01 .341.041.08 .98
NOTE:S.. table 17.Table 21
Michigan(RSQE) Economattic Forecasts and MBER—ASASurvey
Forecastsof Nominal. and Peal GM? Growth and IPD Inflation Rates
bySpan.1970—90
Michisan For.ciats
Line Span(Qs) H MAERHSE
(1)(2)(3)
GrouD Mean ForecastsRMSERatios.i/H
K MAE RI4SEQ MD Q3
(4) (5) (6) (7)(8) (9)
Gross Netional Product (ON?)



























NOTE: The Michigan forecastscov.rth. period1970:4—1990:1, exceptforthe
followingquarters: 71:2,72:2, 73:2, 74:2, 75:1.,75:2, 76:1,77:2. 78:2. and
79:2. W. match the N3EP.—A5A forecaststothe Michigan forecasts period by
period.Tb. ratios in columns7—9 areR2ISE/RHSF,I, wherethe subscriptt refers
to individual forecasts fromtheN8E&—ASAsurveysand thesubscriptH r.f.r. to
theMichiganforecasts.
1 0—1 —.09.801.08 —.09.51.66.36 .73.95
2 0—2 .131.241.60 —.07 .91.1.1.8.73 .891.05
3 0—3 .341.45 1.91. .021.331.73.951.111.27
4 0—4 .51.1.812.38 .041.642.15na.1.001.26
3 0—5 .972.152.93—.021.992.61..761.001.19Table 22
Michigan (&SQE) EconometricFotscastaandHBEP.—ASA Survey
ForacascaofPercentChang.ainConsumption. Investment,and Defense
Expenditursa. by Span. 1981—90 and 1968—81
Michisan ForecastaCrouoMeanForecasts RIISERatios.ifM
LineSpan(Qs) K MAE81(SE K MAE RMSE Q Hi) Q,
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)(8) (9)
rarspnal ConaumocjpnExoenditurea(PCE
I 0—1 —.12 .56 .76 —.14 .47 .59 .82.89 1.56
2 0—2 —.19 .73 .89 —.24 .64 .77 .78.97 1.25
3 0—3 —.26 .931.15 —.39 .84 .99 .98 1.15 1.41.
4 0—4 —.351.101.34 —.511.041.25 .94 1.21 1.52
5 0—5 —.411.211.51 —.661.281.56 .92 1.30 1.51.
Nonreatdential Fixed Investment (NFl)
6 0—1 —.632.042.65 —.691.682.10 .71.93 1.18
7 0—2 —1.043.254.26 —.932.743.52 .81 1.00 1.29
8 0—3 —1.09 4.91 5.94 —1.384.035.23 .70.87 1.09
9 0—4 —.95 6.47 7.48 —1.715.577.09 .76.93 1.16
10 0—5 —.84 7.71.8.68 —2.167.579.11 .82 1.10 1.33
Residential Fixed Investment (RFI)
11 0—1 —.34 2.533.54 —.872.153.29.79 1.36 1.57
12 0—2 —.303.893.93 —1.994.347.55 .92 1.20 1.79
13 0—4 .315.267.57 —3.726.5111.43 .92 1.11 1.37
14 0—4 1.36 6.59 9.02 —5.438.43 16.32 .96 1.16 1.29
15 0—3 2.32 8.19 10.56 —7.51 10.55 17.46 .931.1.4 1.26
NationalDefense E,mendituree (OFF)
16 0—1 —.092.182.54 —.071.442.00 .85.98 1.20
1.7 0—2 —.282.893.65 .56. 2.283.08 .84 1.04 1.19
18 0—3 —.493.754.52 —1.493.134.09 .74.92 1.15
19 0—4 —.65 4.034.76 —2.144.345.23.79 1.01 1.25
20 0—5 —.95 5.846.83 —3.645.457.07 .67.80.99
NOTE: S..Table 21.Table 23
Michigan (RSQE) Econometric Forecasts and NBER—ASA Forscascs of

















MOTE: S.. Tab].. 21.
Target Mich!ean Forecista
LineQuarter H MAE P.MSE
(1)(2)(3)
Crouo Mean ForecastsRJSE Ratios. i/H
M MAERZISE Q MD Q




























































































































Sims ModelForecasts (Iwo Variants) and NBER—ASASurveyForecasts




















































































































































































Imol.icit Price Deflator. 1968—90 (IPD)SI ModelFotecast(Sj CrOUDMeenForecp RMSE Rtioi. i/S
L.in.Spsn(Q3) M MAE RMSE M MAE RNSE Q1W
(1)(2) (3) (4)(5)(6) (7)(6)(9)
Variant8
26 0—1 0 0 0 n.en.e. n.e.
27 0—2 —.02.31 .39 1.31 1.521.81.
28 0—3 —.05.55 .69 1.43 1.631.91
29 0—4 —.09 .76 .96 1.51 1.681.90
30 0—5 —.161.021.26 1.47 1.711.98Table 25
Sims Model Forecasts (Variant A) and NBER—ASA Survey Forecasts
of the Unemployment Rate, the Treasury Bill Rate, and Growth in
Real Nonresidential Investment, by Target Quarter,
or Span. 1968—90 and 1981—90
Target Sims Model Forecasts
Line Quarter N MAE RMSE
orSpan(Q5) (1) (2) (3)
Crouo Mean Forecasts RuSERatios, I/S
M MAERuSE Q1 MI)
(4)(5) (6) (7) (8)(9)
Unemolovisent Rate 1968—90 (IJR)
Treasury Bill Rate. 1981—90 (TBR)
Nonresidential Fixed Inveensent. 1981—90 (NFl)
NOTE to tables 24 and 25:Sims' is a nine—variable, five—lag quarterly
probabilistic model (see text for more detail). The Sims forecasts contain no
gapsand refer to the same periods as those covered by theNOER—ASA aurvey
forecasts(individual and group means). The entries in columns7—9 represent
ratios R1(SE/RflSEs.wherethe subscript irefersto individual forecastsfrom the
surveysandthesubscript S refers to the Sims model forecasts.Qt andQ3denote
thelower and upper quartile ratios,andMDdenotethe medianratios.
Variant A assumes thatthelast known values of the variables to be
predicted refer to the quarter t—l (denoted 0); variant B sssumesthat theyrefer





















6 1 —.341.271.57 .01 .15 .20
7 2 —.541.471.84 .13 .68 .90
8 3 —.601.692.13 .351.091.38














































ARIMA Modal Forecasts(Two Variants) and N8ER—ASA Survey Forecasts
of Nominal.andRealCM?Growth, and IPD Inflation,
bySpan. 1968—90
ARI.KA ARTHA Forecasts RuSE Ratios i/A
LineSpan(Qs) Modst(A) N MAE RuSE Q MD Q,
(1) (2)(3) (6) (5) (6) (7)
CrossMationsl Product (CM?)
VariantA
1 0—1. n.a. —.11 .951.18 .48 .61. .82
2 0—2 —.291.642.05 .53 .64 .74
3 0—3 —.552.513.04 .51 .61 .73
4 0—6 —.853.324.00 .51. .58 .69
5 0—5 —1.194.114.96 .49 .61. .74
VariantB
6 0—1 na. 0 0 0 n.e.n.a.n.a.
7 0—2 .12 .941.18 .64 .17 .86
8 0—3 .321.622.02 .71 .81 .95
9 0—4 .592.683.01 .61 .11. .87
10 0—5 .913.283.96 .59 .74 .94
CrossMationpiProductinConstant Dollars (RCNP)
VariantA
11 0—1 1,1,0 —.06 .801.03 .60.74.94
12 0—2 —.141.331.68 .67 .79.94
13 0—3 —.271.912.33 .11 .821.00
14 0—4 . —.402.312.88 .11.861.05
15 0—5 —.542.823.39 .76.931.11
Variant 5
16 0—1 1.1,0 0 0 0 na.n.a.n.a.
1.7 0—2 .06 .811.04 .78 .931.08
18 0—3 .161.331.68 .911.041.21
19 0—4 .281.932.35 .931.071.29
20 0—5 .432.392.91 .991.111.34
ImolicicPriceDeflator (TPD1
VariantA
21 0—1 1.1.2 .05 .38 .50 .72 .931.11
22 0—2 .15.801.00 .71. .811.10
23 0—4 .291.271.60 .68 .901.11
24 0—4 .491.842.29 .65.931.16
25 0—5 .742.473.07 .631.021.28ARIMA ARIMA Forecasts .RIISE Ratios i/A
Line Span(Qa) Model(A) N MAE RMSE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variant B
26 0—1 1.1,2 0 0 0 n.m.n.m.n.m.
27 0—2 —.05 .39 .51 .941.101.39
28 0—3 —.1.6 .801.01 .971.17 1.37
29 0—4 —.32 1.27 1.62 .881.111.33
30 0—5 —.531.862.32 .791.14 1.60
n.m.Not available(forecasta obtained from those for RCNP and IPD).Table 27
ARIMAModel Forecasts (Variant A) and NBER—ASASurvey
Forecasts ofthe Unemp1oya.nc Rat., theTreasuryBill Rat.,
and Crowth in Real. Nonresidential Invasteenc, by Target Quarter,


























































NOTE to Tables 26 and 27: The specifications of the ARIMA models ar, as in Sims
and Todd 1991, Table 1.For mor, detail, see pp. 3-4. The entries in
col.umns 5—6rspr.s.nr ratiosRMSi/RflSE*. where thesubscriptireZ.rsto
individual,forecasts from the NRER—ASA surveysandth. subscript A refers to the
ARIMA model forecasts.Table 28
JeutzModel Forecasts and NBER—ASAS..rveyForecasts
of Notnal and RealGNPro,.rch and IPD InflatIon,
by Span, 1976—1990
Jouc: Nodal Foracaats(J)








Cross National Product (C1P)
1 0—1 .04 .72 .96
2 0—2 .09 1.21.1.52










Cross National ProductinConstant Dollars (RCtP)
5 0—1. .02 .64 .85
6 0—2 .081.05 1.31
7 0—3 .181.38 1.68
8 0—4 .301.531.90
—.08 .53 .65 .861.071.40
—.10 .811.03 .841.03 1.45
—.051.031.35 .951.211.55
—.041.121.37 .891.121.51
Ie1icit Price Deflator (IPD
9 0—1 .01. .29 .37
10 0—2 .00 .53 .65










Nine Sets of Forecasts Ranked According to Their Average RJISEs,
Three Veriables, 1968:4—1990:1
Cross National CUP in Constant implicit Price
Product (CUP) Dollsrs (RCNP) Deflator ()PD
Line Forecast ARMSERank ARNSERank ARtIStRank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
I NBER—ASAmedian 190 4 1.94 7 1.53 7
2 UBER—ASAconsensus 1.586 1 1.58 3 1.21 5
3 Michigan (RSQE) 1.98 S 1.87 5 1.42 6
6 BVAR(A) 2.69 8 1.90 6 1.62 8
5 BVAR(B) 1.89 3 1.40 1 1.03 3
6 Sims(A) 2.30 7 2.08 8 .97 2
7 Sims(B) 1.594 2 1.47 2 .66 1
8 Sims—Todd ARIMA(A) 3.05 9 2.26 9 1.69 9
9 Sims—Todd ARIMA(B)2.03 6 1.60 4 1.09 4
NOTE:ARNSE (average root mean square error) is computed by taking the mean of
the RuSts across the five spans 0—1 0—S. The smallest ARtISt is ranked 1,
the largest ARtISt is ranked 9, for each of the three variables.
SOURCE: Line L is based on entries in table 10, line 3, columns 1—5; line 2. on
table 9, column 6; line 3, on table 21. column 3; lines 4 and 5, on table 13.
column 3; lines 6 and 7, on table 26, column 3; and lines 8 and 7, on table 26.
column 6.table 30
Six Sets of Forecasts Ranked According to their RXSEs Averaged Across Spans.
21 Variables. 1968:4—1990:1, 1968:4—1981:2 and 1981:3—1990:1
Averafe Root Mean Sousre Error (AFJISE') and theCorrespond ins Rprdctl
Sims
NIER—ASA Surveys Croup BVAR Michigan Probabilistic ARIMA
Median Individual (Consensus) Model (RSQE) Model Model
LineVerieble Forecast Forecast ForecastForecast Forecast Foretast
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1968:4—1990:1
1 GNP 1.90(2) 1.59(1) 2.69(5) 1.98(3) 2.30(4) 3.05(6)
2 RCNP 1.94(4) 1.58(1) 1.90(3) 1.87(2) 2.08(5) 2.26(6)
3 tPD 1.53(6) 1.21(2) 1.62(5) 1.42(3) .97(1) 1.69(6)
4 IP 4.02(3) 3.56(2) 3.42(1) n.e. n.a. na.
S CP 18.38(3) 17.13(2) 13.71(1) n.a. n.e. n.e.
6 UR .71(4) .62(3) .61(2) .60(1) 1.00(5) 1.21(6)
7 MS .33(3) .29(2) .26(1) n.e. na. n.a.
1968:4—1981:2
8 CD 5.65(2) 5.05(l) 5.93(3) n.e. n.e. n.e.
9 FE 11.49(3) 11.08(2) 4.35(1) n.e. n.a. n.e.
10 DEE 3.92(2) 3.34(1) 8.19(4) 4.46(3) n.e. n.a.
11 CII 11.38(1) 12.38(2) 13.94(3) n.e. n.e. n.e.
1981:3—1990:1
12 RC8I 19.69(2) 18.96(1) 26.69(3) n.e. n.e. n.a.
13 NX 47.29(3) 44.19(2) 21.02(1) n.e. n.e. n.a.
14 FCE 1.30(3) 1.24(2) 5.69(4) 1.13(1) n.e. n.a.
15 NFl 6.06(5) 1.11(1) 5.25(2) 5.80(4) 5.43(3) 6.14(6)
16 REt 9.59(3) 1.22(1) 8.70(2) 10.81(4) n.e. n.e.
17 FCP 4.96(2) 1.38(1) 8.54(3) n.e. n.e. n.e.
18 SLCP 1.47(3) .94(l) 1.27(2) n.e. n.e. n.e.
19 CU 1.19(3) .52(1) .76(2) n.e. n.e. n.e.
20 TIR 1.71(3) 1.35(2) 2.03(4) 1.26(1) 2.14(5) 2.67(6)
21 CII 1.64(3) 1.28(2) 1.72(4) 1.13(1) n.e. n.a.
n.e.— notavailable.
0n the symbols used, see previous tables end text.
bARnSE —averageof the RNSEs etross the five horizons (0—1, ...0—5 or 1,.. .5). Entries in
perenthesesrepresent renics eccording to AB}jSE (smallest to largest).table 31
Six Sets of Forecasts Ranked According to Their Overall Accuracy Across Variables
by Period, 1968:4—1990:1, 1968:4-1981:2. and 1981:2—1990:1
Rankina Accordine to the Sum of Ranks Across Vsriablesb
S has
Number Individual Group BVAR MichiganProbabilisticARIMA
of Median (Consensus) Model (RSQE) Model Model
LineVariables' Forecast Forecast Forecast Forecast Forecast Forecast
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1968:4—1990:1
1 7(1—7) Third(23) Firsc(i3)Second(18) n.a. na. n.a.
2 6(1—36) Thirdfl6) Firsc) Fourth(1S) Second(9) Fourth(15) Sixth(36)
1968:4—1981:2
3 4(8—11) Second(S) First(6) Third(ll) na. n.a. n.a.
1981:2—1990:1
4 10(12—21) Third(30) Firsc(14) Second(27) n.e. na. na.
5 5(14—16,20,21) Third(17) Firsc(8) Fourth(lb) Second(ll) n.a. na.
6 2(15.20) Fourth(8) Firsc(3) Third(6) Second(S) Fourth(S) Sixth(12)
na. —notavailable.
'Identified by lines in table 30 in parentheses.
bsumofthe ranks froa table 30 is given in parentheses.References
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Appendix: Forecasts of Diverse Macroeconomic Series. 1968—81 and 1981—90
A.l Selected Nominal Aureates. 1968—81
Current—dollar expenditures on durable consumer goods, business plant and
equipment, and national defense (CD, P8, and DEF. respectively> all contribute
strongly to the cyclicall.ty and volatility of quarterly changes in CNP. DEF is
generally treated as an important exogenous variable.
The statistics for mean errors suggest that underestimates prevailed in the
forecasts of CD and FE, overestimates in those of DEF. but there is much
dispersion across the individual respondents here, which increases strongly with
the forecast horizon (Table A.l, columns 1—3). The R1(SE measures show much the
same kind of progression (columns 6—6). The forecast errors generally are at
least smaller than the actual percent changes in CD. P8, and DEF. but often not
by much, as can be seen by comparing the corresponding entries in columns 4—6 and
9—11. Most of the SK and KU values are small, and only a few fot CD and DEF may
be significant (columns 7 and 8).
The gains from averaging across the individual forecasts are modest for CD
and DEF and, perhaps surprisingly, hardly existent for P8 (Table A.2, columns 1—
4).The RMSE ratios for FE are closely clustered, indicating lack of
differentiation among the forecasts for this variable. One possible reason may
be the availability and influence of the quarterly anticipation series for plant
and equipment outlays.
The RNSEs of our BVAR forecasts are larger than those of the group mean
forecasts for CD, and much larger for DEF. In contrast, BVAR is found to be much
more accurate than the survey averages for P8. Indeed, the RMSE ratios i/by are
relatively very low for CD and DEF, very high for FE throughout. (Compare thecorresponding measures in columns 1—4 and 5—8).
Finally, the NSER—ASA survey questionnaire used through 1981,2 asked for
forecasts of the levels of inventory investment in current dollars (CBI), another
important but highly volatile and hard—to—predict variable. Table A.3shows
that the mean errors and root mean square errors for CBI increased markedly with
the span, while the corresponding standard deviation did not (lines 1—5). The
M and MD Statistics for mean errors are all positive here, the RNSE for target
quarter 5 (i.e. .t+4)is about equal to the actual RMSV.
Apparently. CBI is another of those rare cases in which combining the
individual survey forecasts is of little help. The group mean's RMSE is
relatively large, and even the lower quartile i/g ratios are close to one (see
Table A.4, lines 1—5). However, our BVAR model performs somewhat worse still
here (cf. columns 1—4 and 5—8).
A.2 ComDonents of Real CUP. 1981—90
After mid—1981, the survey collected forecasts of the main GUI' expenditure
categories in constant dollars. We start with real inventory investment (RCSI).
to follow up on the preceding. It turns out that the RCBI forecasts for 1981—90,
like the CBI forecasts for 1981—90, have RflSEs that are large relative to the
average actual levels and their variability, especially for the moredistant
target quarters (Table A.3, lines 6—10). The average MEs are negativebut very
small, the SDs are large and stable. Again, little is gained by averaging the
individual forecasts, but the group mean forecasts do have a distinct advantage
over the gV.R forecasts (Table A.4, lines 6—10).
Similarly, real net exports (NX) were on the whole poorly predicted inthe
l980s, as seen from the large relative size of the summary error measures inTable A.3, lines 11—15. For NX, too, the group mean forecasts do not help much.
but in this case the BVAR forecasts are found to be much more accurate (Table
A.4. Lines 11—15).
One would expect total consumption (PCE). the largest and smoothest
component of real GNF, to be the easiest to predict and in fact best predicted.
A relatively small but smooth and presumably also well predictable series should
be that of state and local government purchases (SLOP).Federal government
purchases (FOP) are more autonomous and volatile, hence more difficult to
forecast. Residential fixed investment (RFI) is another hard problem for the
forecasters, though for different reasons: it is highly cyclical and an early
leading series (construction lags behind housing permits and starts are short).
nonresidential fixed investment (NFl) has more persistence, more of an upward
trend, and lags at cyclical turning points, which should make it more predictable
than Rn. Also, NFl is anticipated with long leads by new capital appropriations
and contracts and orders for plant and equipment— but these monthly series on
business investment commitments are themselves very volatile.
The evidence on the forecasts of percent changes in PCE, NFl, RFI. FOP, and
SLOP is generally consistent with these priors. Thus, forecasts of growth in PCE
four quarters ahead have errors averaging about half the actual percent change
(Table A.S, lines 1—5). This is not great but fair, and in sharp contrast to the
apparent failure of forecasts of inventory investment (the least predictable of
the components of aggregate demand). The RHSEs of the NFl forecasts are much
smaller than their counterparts for PSI (but the actual percent changes are also
smaller for NFl; cf. the corresponding entries in lines 6—10 an 11—15). The SLOP
forecasts are definitely much more accurate than the FOP forecasts (cf. lines 16—
20 and 21—25).The forecasts share some characteristics across all the variables. All the
H and MD statistics for mean errors are negative, suggesting aprevalenceof
underprediction errors (columns I and 3).The absolute values of these
statistics increase with the span in each case. Indeed, all the summary error
measures, except SK and KU. show such increases, as do the statistics for actual
values,16 The means of theR1'tSEsare generally larger than the medians, and
SK >0.TheKUstatistics are large in some cases, particularly for NFl (short
forecasts) and SLCP.
Combining the individual forecasts into group means reduces the RHSEs for
each variable and span, as can be seen by comparing column 1 in Table A.6 with
column 6 (and a fortiori with column 4) in Table A.5. AC the lower quartile Q1,
the RMSE ratios i/g are close to one throughout; the range of the median ratios
is about l.1'-L3, thatofthe Q3 ratios is 1.2—1.7. The group mean forecasts
perform best (the ratios are highest) for ECE and SLOP. (See Table A.6, columns
2-4).
OurBVAR forecasts have larger RMSEs than the NEER—ASA group mean forecasts
80 percent of the time, according to thepairedentries in columns 1 and 5 of
Table A.6. They are very poor for PCE and definitely inferior for FOP, whereas
elsewhere the differences are much smaller (cf. columns 1—6and5—8).
A.3 Consumer Price Inflation and Interest Rates. 1981—90
Forecasters underpredicted the CPI inflation just as they did the IPD
inflation (see the negative signs of the mean errors in Table A.7, lines 1—5,
columns 1 and 3). The RHSEs of these forecasts are discouragingly large compared
to the descriptive statistics for the actual values (cf. columns 4and6 with 11,
in particular). Note that the NBER—ASAsurveyquestionnaire asked directly forforecasts of the level of Cl'I inflation at annual rate in the current quarter and
the following four quarters (not for forecasts of the CPI itself).
In contrast, the forecasts of the 3—month Treasury bill rate (TBR) had
relatively small errors according to these comparisons (lines 6—10). The
forecasts of the (new high—grade) corporate bond yield (CBY) were even more
accurate (lines 11—15).
Despite the already noted weakness of most of the individual CPI forecasts.
the corresponding group mean forecasts perform relatively well. Their RNSEs are
considerably smaller than those of the &VAR model, and less than half those of
the average individual forecasts (cf. Table A.8, lines 1—5, and Table .7, lines
1—5. columns 4 and 6). The i/g ratios cluster close to one between Q1andQ,
whichindicates that the forecasts concerned are remarkably alike.
For the interest rates TR and CBY, combining the individual forecasts
greatly reduces errors, but with notable exceptions at the most distant target
quarter (5). Here the RMSEs are much larger for the &VAR than the group mean
forecasts, and correspondingly thei/byratios are much lower than the i/g ratios
(cf. Table A.8, lines 6—15, columns1—4 and5—8).Table A.l
Selected Measures of Forecast Accuracy andActualValues. Percent Changes
in Expenditures for Consumer Durable Goods. Plant and Equipment, and National
Defense, by Span. 1968—81
Span Mean Error Root Mean Square Error Acta1 Value
Line (Qa) H SD MD H SD MD 5K KU 96 SD RMSV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11.)
Consmer Expenditures for Durable Coods (CD
1 0—1 —.79 .73 —.87 3.601.06 3.42 .88 .72 1.934.52 6.91
2 0—2 —1.101.26—1.18 5.351.80 4.953.9724.35 3.966.00 7.19
3 0—3 —1.30 1.59—1.26 6.301.52 5.961.45 2.69 5.697.12 9.26
4 0—4 —.972.07 —.87 6.941.83 6.451.73 4.01. 7.86 7.57 10.91
5 0—5 —1.232.61 —.74 8.393.50 7.464.0123.83 9.968.6813.21
Plant and Euionent Expenditures (FE)
6 0—1 —.711.02 —.51. 5.491.15 5.69 .06 —.89 2.366.10 6.53
7 0—2 —1.241.89—1.24 8.492.52 9.00 .40 —.19 '.669.36 10.46
8 0—3 —1.692.55—1.95 11.512.8411.82 —.07 —.70 6.89 11.9913.63
9 0—4 —1.833.12—1.95 13,783.2614.17—.32 —.46 8.86 14.1916.73
10 0—5—2.77 4.18—2.46 16.463.6816.79 —.60 .01 10.83 15.9719.30
Natiopal Defense Expenditures (DEF)
11 0—1. .1.6 .55 .24 2.33 .56 2.25 .54 .71 1.432.51 2.89
12 0—2 .21 .97 .35 3.48 .97 3.41 .72 2.28 2.974.27 5.20
1.3 0—3 .171.52 .40 4.191.21 4.051.02 2.88 4.755.98 7.64
16 0—4 .042.06 .34 4.801.57 4.511.80 6.39 6.607.58 10.05
15 0—5 —.232.62 p.s. 5.791.94 5.382.21 8.93 8.60 9.55 12.85
NOTE: On the sybe1s used. aceprevious tables and text.Table A.2
Individual, Group Mean, and BVAP. Forecasts of Percent Changes in
Expenditures for Consumer Durable Goods, Plant and Equipment, and National
Defense, Selected Comparisons, by Span, 1968—81
National Defense ExDendituret (DEF)








Group Mean RNSE Ratios [/2 SVAR RMSE
RuSEQ MD Q3 RMSE Q1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
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1 0—1 3.23 .72 .931.05
2 0—2 4.70 .88 1.02 1.15
3 0—3 5.38 .88 .98 1.19










3.04 5.82 1.011.051.09 2.19
7 0—2 8.96 1.011.071.10 3.16 2.192.833.33
8 0—3 11.54 1.001.061.10 4.47 2.362.793.20










.87 1.78 1.071.191.38 2.85
12 0—2 2.73 1.051.161.34 5.78 .47 .54 .63
13 0—4 3.31 1.021.171.38 8.53 .38 .45 .54
14 0—4 3.91 1.031.201.44 10.55 .35 .43 .50Table A.3
Selected K.asureaofForacact Accuracy and Actual Va1ue. Nominal
andP.allnvsntory Inv.atenc and RealNetExports, by Span.
1968—81 and 1981—90
Target MeanError Root Mean Sware Error Actual Vphe
tineQuarter M SD MD K SD MD SR KU K SD P..MSV
(1.) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)(9)(10) (11)
Ci.nfe in 8usin.es Inventoriec. 1968—81 (CBI)
1. 1. .432.07 .459.333.659.76 .13—.26 7.3011.27 13.43
2 2 .92 2.421.109.963.6210.24 —.19—.49
3 3 1.59 2.28 1.7310.92 3.9511.59 —.46—.84
4 4 2.57 2.53 2.7811.63 3.7711.84 —.34—.43
5 5 3.542.78 3.3413.01 3.9013.45 —.53—.21
ChanceInSusinass Inventories in Constant Dollars. 1981—90 (RCBI)
6 1 —.20 2.94 —.1818.27 4.6418.58 .581.3514.58 20.37 25.05
7 2 —.473.57 .2718.90 3.7219.26 —.02—.07
8 3 —1.09 3.26 —.8319.70 3.7819.35 .47 .35
9 4 —.08 3.73 —.6420.46 4.1020.25 .41—.22
10 5 —.69 4.41 —.5821.06 4.4721.03 .70 .75
NetExportsof Cood and Services inConstant Dollars. 1981—90 (NX)





NOTE: On thesysbo1sused, seeprevioustibiasand text.Table A.4
Individual. Group Mean, and BVARForecastsof Nominal and Real



















Q1 MD Q3 Q MD Q3
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 1 10.57 .98 1.07 1.15 10.70 .83 1.03 1.15
2 2 10.75 .97 1.07 1.18 13.32 .72 .89 1.02
3 3 12.69 .99 1.07 1.16 14.17 .76 .95 1.07
4 4 13.41 1.00 1.06 1.12 16.24 .78 .91 1.09





































NetExports of Goods and ServicesinConstant Dollars.1981—90 (NX)
11 1 28.04 1.001.031.07 13.282.06 2.30 2.60
12 2 36.45 1.001.041.14 17.712.00 2.21 2.65
13 3 44.91 .98 1.031.11 19.66 2.17 2.45 2.78
14 4 52.11 .981.031.10 23.082.16 2.36 2.51
15 5 59.44 .971.021.08 31.39 1.79 1.94 2.13
NOTE: On the symbols used, see previous tables and text.Table A.5
SelectedMeasures of Forecast ACCUraCy and Actual. Values, Percent Chan8es
in Conaweption, 1nv.atsnt. andGàvernenCCosponents of Real.CU',
bySpan. 1981—90
Span MeanError Root MeanSouare Error Actual Value
Line(Qs) M SD MD K SD MD SK KU K SD RMSV
(1.) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (1.0) (11)
Personal Conauation Exoenditures (PCE)
1 0—1 —.14 .20—.14 .83 .30 .681.61 2.17 .78 .69 1.04
2 0—2 —.26 .29—.29 l..10 .42 .941.81 2.67 1.58 .99 1.86
3 0—3 —.47 .66—.44 1.45 .51.1.271.96 3.76 2.44 1.22 2.73
4 0—6 —.63 .65—.59 1.80 .641.601.96 4.33 3.33 1.41 3.62
5 0—5 —.85 .85—.74 2.23 .862.002.03 4.02 4.221.69 6.55
Nonresidential Fixed Investment (NFl)
6 0—1. —.59 .91—.71 2.852.102.435.0726.62 1.052.00 2.80
7 0—2 —1.221.42 —1.26 4.531.914.073.9918.39 2.21.4.40 4.92
8 0—3 —1.471.88 —1.51 6.762.515.862.32 5.35 3.466.18 7.08
9 0—4 —2.312.38 —2.36 8.472.147.971.43 1.69 4.87 7.85 9.24
10 0—5 —2.763.14 —2.97 10.332.559.991.35 1.81 6.469.26 11.29
R..cidential Fixed Investment (RFI)
11 0—1 —.851.08—.67 4.161.523.831.89 4.70 1.184.84 4.98
12 0—2 —1.872.27 —1.42 7.562.487.18 .67 —.26 2.959.01 4.27
13 0—3 —2.933.19 —2.32 10.233.28 10.14 .36 —.21 5.06 12.5913.57
14 0—6 —4.123.93 —3.56 12.684.26 12.42 .28 —.67 7.39 15.78 17.62
1) 0—5 —5.585.23 —4.94 14.955.07 14.40 .21 —.95 9.90 18.7121.17
FederalGovern,sentPurchases (FOP)
16 0—1 —.601.33 —.5]. 3.99 .813.77 .60 —.37 1.164.15 4.31.
17 0—2 —.791.50—.90 5.251.325.031.49 3.63 2.22 5.24 5.69
18 0—3 —.941.75 —1.21 5.351.435.011.78 4.67 3.09 5.28 6.12
19 0—4 —.742.36 —1.35 5.913.065.273.7517.22 4.00 4.85 6.29
20 0—5 —1.552.70 —1.81 6.161.715.741.14 1.48 5.276.05 8.02
StateandLocal Government Purchase! (SLOP)
21 0—i —.13 .28—.17 .90 .33 .851.87 4.40 .52 .70 .87
22 0—2 —.24 .52—.26 1.24 .561.152.77 9.44 1.121.07 1.55
23 0—3 —.38 .72—.40 1.57 .771.522.61 9.42 1.72 1.32 2.17
24 0—4 —.62 .88—.58 1.89 .921.792.98 .12.01 2.341.56 2.80
25 0—5 —.921,09 —1.13 2.351.112.032.8211.02 2.991.85 3.52
NOTE: On the ybo1a used,cc.previous tablesandtext.Table A.6
Individual, Group Mean, and BVAR Forecasts of Percent Changes in
Investment, and Covernment Components of Real CNP, Selected Consumption.
Comparisons, by Span, 1981—90
Line Span(Qs)
Group Mean RNSE Ratios
RMSE Q1 MD Q3 RMSE
























































































































Federal Government Purchases (FCP)
3.31 1.00 1.14 1.27 4.61 .72 .80 .95
4.22 1.02 1.10 1.29 7.26 .59 .65 .82
4.11 1.04 1.181.37 9.02 .50 .54 .66
3.79 1.13 1.31 1.48 10.39 .39 .52 .63
4.55 1.07 1.30 1.48 11.44 .44 .53 .65
State and LocalGovernmentPurchases (SLGP)
.61 1.14 1.23 1.51 .49 1.40
.751.02 1.19 1.39 .82 1.09
.91 1.00 1.17 1.27 1.20 1.11
1.07 1.131.191.40 1.68 .1.13











Selected Measures of Forecast Accuracy and Actual Values,




Mean Error RootKeenSquare Error
K SD MD K SD MD 5K
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Actual Value
KU K SD LMSV
(8) (9) (10) (11)
Consumer Price Index. Percent Chance (C?!)
Treasury Bill Rate. 3—Month. Percent (TBR)
Coroorate Bond Yield. Percent (CBY)
NOTE: On the symbols used,seeprevioustables and text.
1 1 —.61 .47 —.50 1.20 .391.08 .34—1.37 1.02 .54 1.16
2 2 —.58 .48 —.46 1.18 .431.15 .11—1.41
3 3 —.57 .50 —.46 1.20 .42 1.20 .19—1.36









—.50 1.23 .391.24 .00—1.41
8.382.48 8.74 —.03 .49 .36 .40 2.50 8.01
7 2 .19 .49 .24 1.51 .511.52 .06 2.75
8 3 .39 .68 .61 1.85.501.80 .11 .85









1.03 2.48 .712.62 —.42 1.09
5.6511.662.3411.87 —.24 .72 .35 .63 2.01
12 2 —.00 .48 .12 1.59 .591.37 .66 —.26
13 3 .21.61 .31 1.86.491.81 .78 .51
14 4 .39.72 .58 2.05.432.02 .39 —.28Table A8
Individual, Group Mean, and BVAR Forecasts of Consumer Price
Inflation, Treasury Bill Rate, and Corporate Bond Yield, Selected
Comparisons, by Span, 1981—90
Line Quarter RNSE
(1)




Consumer Price Index. Percent Chanee (CPI)
NOTE: On the symbols used, see previous tables and text,





















.53 1.011.031.12 .54 1.63
.46 1.011.031.12 -.74 1.02
.68 1.011.031.18 .78 1.05
.56 1.011.021.09 .80 1.07













































Coroorate Bond Yield. Percent (CBY)
.38 1.171.571.81 .77 .56
.83 1.151.482.52 1.26 .72
1.24 1.091.251.74 1.74 .77
1.51 1.031.191.46 2.19 .69
.77
.95
.92
.88
.98
1.75
1.25
1.03
2.46
2.11
1.54
1.29
1.18